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Coordinating Compliance Incentives

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COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES

Veronica Root†

In today's regulatory environment, a corporation engaged in wrongdoing can be sure of one thing: regulators will point to an ineffective compliance program as a key cause of institutional misconduct. The explosion in the importance of compliance is unsurprising given the emphasis that governmental actors—from the Department of Justice, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to even the Commerce Department—place on the need for institutions to adopt “effective compliance programs.” The governmental actors that demand effective compliance programs, however, have narrow scopes of authority. DOJ Fraud handles violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, while the SEC adjudicates claims of misconduct under the securities laws, and the Federal Trade Commission deals with concerns regarding anticompetitive behavior. This segmentation of enforcement authority has created an information and coordination problem amongst regulators, resulting in an enforcement regime where institutional misconduct is adjudicated in a piecemeal fashion. Enforcement actions focus on compliance with a particular set of laws instead of on whether the corporate wrongdoing is a result of a systematic compliance failure that requires a comprehensive, firm-wide, compliance overhaul. As a result, the government's goal of incentivizing companies to implement “effective ethics and compliance programs” appears at odds with its current enforcement approach.

Yet governmental actors currently have the tools necessary to provide strong inducements for corporations to, when needed, engage in restructuring of their compliance programs.

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This Article argues that efforts to improve corporate compliance would benefit from regulatory mechanisms that (i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist behavior across diverse regulatory areas and (ii) aggressively sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. If governmental actors adopt a new enforcement strategy aimed at “Coordinating Compliance Incentives,” they can more easily detect when an institution is suffering from a systemic compliance failure, which may deter firms from engaging in recidivist behavior. If corporations are held responsible for being repeat offenders across diverse regulatory areas, it may encourage them to implement more robust reforms to their compliance programs and, ultimately, lead to improved ethical conduct and more effective compliance programs within public companies.

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INTRODUCTION

Compliance is king, and its subjects—regulators, prosecutors, courts, corporations, and academics—are quick to tout its power and potential for good. In 2015, the Director of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Enforcement Division stated, “strong legal and compliance functions are critical elements of any successful enterprise, particularly those operating in the securities industry. . . . When legal and compliance departments are not treated as full partners in the business,

regulatory problems are inevitable.”¹ In 2014, the Assistant Attorney General for the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Criminal Division explained that the work of compliance officials “serves to protect the integrity of our public markets, the country’s financial systems, our intellectual property, the retirement accounts of our hardworking citizens, and our taxpayer dollars.”² In 2012, “36 percent of organizations sentenced had a judge order” the adoption of a compliance program, compared to only 6 percent in 2008.³ And these strong signals, and others like them, have led corporations to focus on strengthening their internal compliance programs.⁴ For example, in 2014, the President and CEO of Walmart Stores, in the midst of weathering a stunning bribery scandal, discussed the company’s goal “to become the model of excellence in global compliance and ethics.”⁵ Additionally, the President and CEO of Walmart International stated that “[a]s a global company, we have responsibilities to the countries in which we operate. We earn trust through our commitment to compliance.”⁶ These are just a few of numerous examples that demonstrate an unabashed fidelity to compliance efforts within the current legal and regulatory environment.

Yet corporate misconduct continues, and many corporations suffer from multiple compliance failures within relatively short time periods. An example of an institution with repeated

¹ Andrew Ceresney, Dir. of Enft, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at SIFMA’s 2015 Anti-Money Laundering & Financial Crimes Conference (Feb. 25, 2015) (transcript available at <http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022515-spchc.html> [<https://perma.cc/5L7X-4RWU>]) (including a disclaimer that his remarks expressed his own view and did not reflect the views of the SEC or its staff).

² Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 22nd Annual Ethics and Compliance Conference (Oct. 1, 2014) (transcript available at <http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-assistant-attorney-general-criminal-division-leslie-r-caldwell-22nd-annual-ethics> [<https://perma.cc/KM8F-97XY>]) [hereinafter Caldwell, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance].

³ BRANDON L. GARRETT, *TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS* 164 (2014).

⁴ See, e.g., MATT KELLY ET AL., DELOITTE, *IN FOCUS: 2015 COMPLIANCE TRENDS SURVEY 8* (2015) (“U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (plus a host of other enforcement actions, consent decrees, and regulatory statements) clearly favor a strong, independent corporate compliance function. . . . The 2015 Compliance Trends Survey report suggests that more and more organizations are moving in that direction . . .”).

⁵ Walmart Stores’ CEO Discusses F4Q 2014 Results - Earnings Call Transcript, YAHOO! FIN. (Feb. 20, 2014, 7:00 AM), <http://finance.yahoo.com/news/walmart-stores-ceo-discusses-f4q-140113595.html> [<https://perma.cc/C3RD-7PWA>].

⁶ Q4 2014 WalMart Stores, Inc. Prerecorded Earnings Conference Call – Final, FAIR DISCLOSURE WIRE, Feb. 20, 2014, GALE, Doc. No. A360716228.

instances of misconduct is HSBC Group (HSBC), a large, multinational financial services company with around thirty-seven million customers in seventy countries and territories.⁷ Each year, for the past six years, a governmental body has determined that HSBC, through one of its subsidiaries, has engaged in some type of regulatory or legal misconduct.

- In 2010, HSBC North America Holdings, Inc. (HSBC NA) and the Federal Reserve Board (Federal Reserve) entered into a consent Cease and Desist Order requiring HSBC NA to improve its firm-wide compliance risk-management program with a specific emphasis on its anti-money laundering efforts.⁸
- Also in 2010, HSBC Securities (USA) settled charges brought by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority for failing to adequately disclose the risks associated with auction rate securities to customers.⁹
- In 2011, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, sued HSBC NA for violations of the securities laws in connection with private-label mortgage-backed securities purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during 2005-2007. In 2014, HSBC settled these claims for \$550 million.¹⁰
- In 2012, HSBC Holdings PLC (HSBC Holdings) and HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC USA) entered into an agreement with the DOJ and admitted to violating the U.S. Bank Secrecy Act, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and the Trading with the Enemy Act.¹¹ As part of its settlement agreement with the DOJ, HSBC Holdings and HSBC USA agreed to retain a corporate compliance

⁷ *Structure and Network*, HSBC, <http://www.hsbc.com/about-hsbc/structure-and-network> [<https://perma.cc/FMC4-SQ2M>] (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). HSBC has four major business areas: Commercial Banking, Global Banking and Markets, Global Private Banking, and Retail Banking and Wealth Management. *Id.*

⁸ Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 7, 2010), <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20101007a.htm> [<https://perma.cc/F7GP-35RG>].

⁹ News Release, FINRA, FINRA Fines HSBC Securities (USA) \$1.5 million, US Bancorp \$275,000 for Auction Rate Securities Violations (Apr. 22, 2010), <http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2010/finra-fines-hsbc-securities-usa-15-million-us-bancorp-275000-auction-rate-securities> [<https://perma.cc/228E-BYL3>].

¹⁰ News Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Announces Settlement with HSBC (Sept. 12, 2014), <http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-Settlement-with-HSBC.aspx> [<https://perma.cc/G722-BMWX>].

¹¹ Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit \$1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations> [<https://perma.cc/X8CF-Y8WF>].

monitor for a five-year period.¹² The U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the U.S. Federal Reserve Board were also involved in investigating the HSBC entities' unlawful activity.¹³ In 2015, the monitor indicated that while HSBC Holdings has improved its compliance in some areas, its corporate culture and compliance technology still do not meet the requirements of the deferred prosecution agreement the bank agreed to as part of a 2012 settlement.¹⁴

- Also in 2012, a United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations case study determined that HSBC USA repeatedly failed to detect international money laundering, connections to terrorist financing, and violations of U.S. economic and trade sanctions.¹⁵
- In 2013, HSBC USA, N.A. self-reported three apparent violations of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations to the Office of Foreign Asset Control and agreed to remit \$32,400 as part of its settlement with Office of Foreign Asset Control.¹⁶
- Also in 2013, HSBC entered into an agreement with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve to settle allegations that it engaged in mortgage foreclosure abuse.¹⁷

¹² Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 15–17, *United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.*, No. 12-763 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012), ECF No. 3-2, <http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2012/12/11/dpa-executed.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/3C3N-MEYR>].

¹³ News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Assesses \$500 Million Civil Money Penalty Against HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Dec. 11, 2012), <http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-173.html> [<https://perma.cc/WAZ5-5GAJ>]; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 11, 2012) <https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/20121211b.htm> [<https://perma.cc/XL7L-BP7Z>].

¹⁴ Letter from Loretta Lynch et al., U.S. Attorney, to the Hon. John Gleeson, Justice for the U.S. Dist. Court, E. Dist. of N.Y. at 2, *United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.*, No. 12-763 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2015), ECF No. 33.

¹⁵ S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., U.S. VULNERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING, DRUGS, AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HSBC CASE HISTORY 10 (2012), <http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=2a76c00f-7c3a-44c8-902e-3d9b5dbd0083> [<https://perma.cc/DSC7-XC4Y>].

¹⁶ *HSBC Bank USA, N.A. Settles Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations*, OFF. FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL: ENFORCEMENT INFO. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20131217_hsbcc.pdf [<https://perma.cc/Z7NN-LF28>].

¹⁷ News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC and Federal Reserve Reach Agreement with HSBC to Provide \$249 Million in Payments and Assistance (Jan. 18, 2013), <http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-ia-2013-13.html> [<https://perma.cc/Y6Y9-GMLG>].

- In 2014, HSBC entered into a settlement with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission for charges related to manipulation of the foreign exchange market.¹⁸
- Also in 2014, HSBC Private Bank (Suisse) S.A. (HSBC Suisse) settled charges related to its willfully providing “unregistered broker-dealer and investment advisory services to U.S. clients” in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.¹⁹
- In 2015, HSBC Suisse was placed under investigation for potentially assisting its clients with tax evasion in the U.S., France, and other countries.²⁰
- In 2016, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency assessed a \$35 million penalty against HSBC Bank USA, N.A. for violating Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act due to improper billing of customers for a credit-monitoring product marketed and sold by the bank and its affiliate.²¹

Thus, HSBC is a complex organization that has repeatedly engaged in actions that violate statutory or regulatory requirements. HSBC has not, however, been labelled a repeat offender or recidivist by any governmental or regulatory authorities. Importantly, HSBC’s history of compliance failures is neither remarkable nor unique.²² Many other corporate entities have similarly long lists evidencing noncompliance with legal and

¹⁸ Press Release, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Five Banks to Pay over \$1.4 Billion in Penalties for Attempted Manipulation of Foreign Exchange Benchmark Rates (Nov. 12, 2014), <http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7056-14> [<https://perma.cc/UQW8-DCP7>].

¹⁹ Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, *SEC Charges HSBC’s Swiss Private Banking Unit with Providing Unregistered Services to U.S. Clients* (Nov. 25, 2014), <http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543534789#.VQhOXkKprzl> [<https://perma.cc/H3E4-JV75>].

²⁰ John Letzing, *HSBC Hit by Fresh Details of Tax Evasion Claims*, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 9, 2015), <http://www.wsj.com/articles/hsbc-hit-by-fresh-details-of-tax-evasion-claims-1423482612> [<https://perma.cc/CPC2-SZHG>]; see also Martha M. Hamilton et al., *New Countries Seek HSBC Data and Undeclared Cash*, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Feb. 23, 2015, 6:30 AM), <http://www.icij.org/project/swiss-leaks/new-countries-seek-hsbc-data-and-undeclared-cash> [<https://perma.cc/D3K4-D6BJ>].

²¹ News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Assesses \$35 Million Penalty Against HSBC Bank USA, N.A.; Orders Restitution to Customers for Unfair Billing Practices (Apr. 13, 2016), <https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-45.html> [<https://perma.cc/7QW8-D9WT>].

²² See, e.g., *Corporate Rap Sheets*, CORP. RES. PROJECT, <http://corp-research.org/corporaterapsheets> [<https://perma.cc/6YYV-W8C4>] (linking to dossiers on several companies’ compliance failures).

regulatory requirements across a variety of legal areas.²³ All this leads to the question: Why has the government largely failed to sanction corporate repeat offenders as recidivists?

Part I discusses the piecemeal origins of corporate compliance programs—various regulatory and statutory requirements, paired with the government’s enforcement structure, as well as pressure from private parties. Part II systematically looks at the treatment of corporations entering into repeated settlement agreements over time through a case study of DOJ Fraud enforcement actions. The case study demonstrates that corporations that engage in misconduct that is similar in underlying purpose and behavior are not treated as repeat offenders when sanctioned by distinct governmental agents but are treated as repeat offenders when before the same enforcement authority on multiple occasions.

Part III suggests that information, coordination, and lack of identified responsibility challenges may partially explain the findings of the case study. It then puts forth the thesis of this Article—efforts to improve incentives to create effective corporate compliance programs would benefit from regulatory mechanisms that (i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist behavior across diverse regulatory areas and (ii) aggressively sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. In short, governmental actors would benefit from more coordinated enforcement efforts aimed at sanctioning recidivist conduct, which in turn would increase incentives for private firms to engage in systematic revisions to their compliance programs. Part III then outlines a proposal for reform, which provides a framework for detecting recidivist public corporations through their current reporting obligations to the SEC and a structural mechanism for coordinating governmental efforts to incentivize private firms to implement more robust compliance programs. Part IV discusses benefits of and objections to the Article’s proposal and then addresses some unresolved concerns raised by the case study and proposal.

²³ See, e.g., GARRETT, *supra* note 3, at 166 (“It is not at all clear that prosecutors take corporate recidivism seriously. Some settlements reflect prior crimes, but often they do not appear to do so. Companies with several environmental convictions include BP, ExxonMobil (with four convictions since 2001), McWane Inc., and a series of ocean shipping companies.”).

I

A REGIME OF PIECEMEAL COMPLIANCE

A focus on compliance within corporations has increased exponentially over the past two decades, and it appears poised to continue to grow in importance.²⁴ Regulators, prosecutors, and industry insiders have all bought into the idea that establishing and maintaining an effective compliance program is key to ensuring corporations adhere to increasingly complex legal and regulatory requirements.²⁵

As this Part will demonstrate, the origins of compliance programs are a natural consequence of a number of circumstances. Statutory and regulatory mandates require firms within certain industries to develop compliance programs. Additionally, prosecutors provide concrete incentives for private firms to create effective compliance programs because a program's existence can serve as a defense or mitigating factor to actual or potential criminal prosecution. Moreover, incentives created by governmental enforcement priorities encourage corporations to pressure their own private business partners to adhere to certain compliance standards.

A. Piecemeal Statutory & Regulatory Dictates

Perhaps it is unsurprising that today's compliance regime has been undertaken in a piecemeal fashion when one considers the various statutory and regulatory dictates that have led to many corporate compliance priorities. There is no formal statute or regulation that requires firms to engage in comprehensive compliance efforts. Instead, there are specific statutory and regulatory admonishments that require firms within certain industries to implement discrete compliance programs.

For example, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 requires banks to adopt an anti-money laundering program.²⁶ Specifically, it requires banks to (i) develop internal policies, procedures, and

²⁴ See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, *Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance*, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2077 (2016) ("Over the past decade, compliance has blossomed into a thriving industry, and the compliance department has emerged, in many firms, as the co-equal of the legal department.").

²⁵ See, e.g., Ceresney, *supra* note 1 ("Today more than ever, given the vastly increased financial regulatory structure, legal and compliance must be gatekeepers in ensuring conformance with the law.").

²⁶ See Geoffrey P. Miller, *An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs* 3 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-39, 2014) [hereinafter Miller, *Economic Analysis*] (citing Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1) (2012)), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2533661.

controls;²⁷ (ii) designate a compliance officer to oversee the bank's efforts;²⁸ (iii) provide training to employees on an ongoing basis in an effort to prevent money laundering;²⁹ and (iv) implement an independent audit function to test the effectiveness of the bank's programs.³⁰ Thus, in as early as the 1970s, actions were taken in an effort to mandate that private firms engage in effective policing efforts; those efforts have continued to grow.³¹

In 2002, in response to the Enron and Arthur Andersen scandals,³² Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was described by former President George W. Bush as "the most far reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt."³³ Sarbanes-Oxley "mandated a number of reforms to enhance corporate responsibility" as well as "enhance[d] financial disclosures and combat[ed] corporate and accounting fraud."³⁴ Specifically, it emphasized the importance of "internal compliance and enhanced internal corporate controls [and] . . . effectively forced corporate gatekeepers to 'commit' to corporate compliance."³⁵ As such, Sarbanes-Oxley and corresponding regulatory reforms increased the emphasis on compliance within private firms. "More than a decade following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, both 'compliance' and 'risk management' have become key functions within public corporations."³⁶ Today, it is very uncommon for regulators to encounter public companies that "do not have any compliance program."³⁷

²⁷ See *id.* at 3–4.

²⁸ See 12 C.F.R. § 326.8(c)(2) (2016) (clarifying the purpose of compliance officers).

²⁹ See 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (explaining that the purpose of the statute is to "guard against money laundering").

³⁰ See Miller, *Economic Analysis*, *supra* note 26, at 4.

³¹ See Miriam H. Baer, *Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud*, 66 FLA. L. REV. 87, 143 (2014).

³² See Lawrence A. Cunningham, *Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform*, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2014); Geoffrey P. Miller, *The Compliance Function: An Overview* 3 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-36, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2527621 [hereinafter Miller, *Compliance Function*].

³³ *The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry*, U.S SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, <http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#sox2002> [<https://perma.cc/4LPJ-WVVC>] (last modified Oct. 1, 2013).

³⁴ *Id.*

³⁵ Baer, *supra* note 31, at 141–42 (citing Manuel A. Utset, *Time-Inconsistent Management & the Sarbanes-Oxley Act*, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 417, 442 (2005)).

³⁶ *Id.* at 143.

³⁷ Caldwell, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance, *supra* note 2.

More recently, in response to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, which included a requirement that regulators overseeing banks implement the “Volcker Rule.”³⁸ The Volcker Rule regulations prohibit banks from engaging in proprietary trading and restrict commercial banks and their affiliates from investing in hedge funds and private equity firms.³⁹ The regulations detail the necessary “components of an effective compliance program”⁴⁰ and require mid-sized banks to adhere to the “following six elements: written policies and procedures; a system of internal controls; a management framework that clearly delineates responsibility and accountability for compliance; independent testing and audit of the effectiveness of the compliance program; training for trading personnel and managers; and making and keeping records sufficient to demonstrate compliance.”⁴¹ Additionally, the Volcker Rule requires that Chief Executive Officers (CEO) at companies subject to the rule “attest that the company’s compliance program is reasonably designed to achieve compliance with [the rule.]”⁴²

These are just a few of what are many different statutory or regulatory frameworks that require corporations to engage in specific compliance efforts.⁴³ The manner in which these different requirements came into being makes sense intuitively. As Congress or regulators encountered areas of corporate misconduct, they responded by requiring organizations to implement reforms targeted at improving policing within firms and compliance with specific legal and regulatory mandates. As these various requirements were enacted, private firms then created or modified existing compliance programs, on a piecemeal basis, so that their programs would adhere to the regulatory changes.

³⁸ See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-31 (2010); Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, *Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks of Hedging with Credit Derivatives*, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 813, 822 (2014).

³⁹ See 17 C.F.R. pt. 75 (2016); Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5808, 5810 (Jan. 31, 2014).

⁴⁰ Miller, *Economic Analysis*, *supra* note 26, at 6.

⁴¹ Miller, *Compliance Function*, *supra* note 32, at 13.

⁴² 12 C.F.R. pt. 248, app. B.

⁴³ See generally Miller, *Economic Analysis*, *supra* note 26, at 3 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (noting that effective compliance programs may deter prosecution or lower sanctions); see also Baer, *supra* note 31, at 142 (discussing prosecution agreements and reduced criminal sanctions)).

B. Diverse, Enforcement-Related Incentives

A number of enforcement-related policies and practices have also resulted in changes to corporate compliance programs. Governmental actors adopt certain enforcement strategies in an effort to leverage companies' strong interests in avoiding sanctions for failing to comply with legal and regulatory requirements. The government is able to encourage private firms to engage in aggressive self-policing efforts by providing leniency to corporations who, though engaged in misconduct, nevertheless have "effective compliance programs,"⁴⁴ and by ramping up sanctions for companies who failed to ensure that their agents comply with the law.⁴⁵

The framework empowering the government's enforcement-related incentives comes primarily through the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Organizational Guidelines. Twenty-six years ago, in 1991, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated, and, in a section entitled "Effective Compliance and Ethics Program," organizations were admonished to "exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct; and . . . otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law."⁴⁶ The Organizational Guidelines, pursuant to requirements in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, were revised in 2004 "to further define the meaning of an effective compliance and ethics program."⁴⁷

Today, the Organizational Guidelines outline "seven key criteria for establishing an 'effective compliance program.'"⁴⁸

- Oversight by high-level personnel;
- Due Care in delegating substantial discretionary authority;

⁴⁴ In addition to these types of governmental frameworks, there are also self-regulatory organizations that are utilized to "implement rules that prevent" organizational misconduct. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, *Benchmark Regulation*, 102 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 41-42), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2776731.

⁴⁵ See Caldwell, Remarks at Ethics and Compliance, *supra* note 2 (discussing that a corporation that engaged in "massive disregard for compliance," was prosecuted, eventually pleaded guilty, and was ultimately required to pay a record \$8.8 billion penalty).

⁴⁶ U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 1991).

⁴⁷ Baer, *supra* note 31, at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted).

⁴⁸ PAULA DESIO, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES, <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/HF99-W8ZY>] [hereinafter DESIO, OVERVIEW].

- Effective Communication to all levels of employees;
- Reasonable steps to achieve compliance, which include systems for monitoring, auditing, and reporting suspected wrongdoing without fear of reprisal;
- Consistent enforcement of compliance standards including disciplinary mechanisms; and
- Reasonable steps to respond to and prevent further similar offenses upon detection of a violation.⁴⁹

These guidelines, if followed, provide concrete suggestions for corporations developing comprehensive compliance programs. Because of the different business realities that individual corporations face, the guidelines provide broad-based requirements that businesses can implement in a manner that makes the most sense for their particular business risks.

Since companies have different characteristics, history, and cultures, any attempt to specify the ingredients of an effective program at a granular level will likely generate poor results. No regulator or prosecutor can hope to know more about the internal workings of an organization than the existing managers who spend their professional lives there.⁵⁰

Thus, the Organizational Guidelines as currently written are generally considered a strong source of guidance for corporations interested in developing, on their own initiative, an effective compliance program.⁵¹

There is, however, a limitation within the overarching framework of the Organizational Guidelines that encourages piecemeal compliance: they are invoked formally only when a prosecution is contemplated against a corporation engaged in misconduct, and prosecutions are often focused on a narrow aspect of misconduct. Prosecutors often “demand that targets upgrade compliance programs as a condition to deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements,” and “[s]ettlements of regulatory enforcement actions often include undertakings to enhance compliance activities.”⁵² These enforcement-related incentives, however, do not typically encourage corporations to engage in comprehensive modifications to their compliance programs; instead, the focus is on a particular aspect of a

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ Miller, *Economic Analysis*, *supra* note 26, at 19.

⁵¹ See Miller, *Compliance Function*, *supra* note 32, at 12 (noting that the Sentencing Guidelines may have been “the earliest statement of the requirements for a robust compliance program”). But see GARRETT, *supra* note 3, at 160 (noting that because the guidelines “do not give meaningful credit for good corporate conduct . . . law professor Jennifer Arlen has called the guidelines a ‘failure.’”).

⁵² Miller, *Compliance Function*, *supra* note 32, at 11.

firm's compliance program.⁵³ Thus, while the compliance framework contemplated in the guidelines is quite broad, the actual enforcement mechanisms that lead to the invocation of the goals within the Organizational Guidelines are often quite narrow. Additionally, the Organizational Guidelines often serve in a purely advisory capacity, as they technically do not govern or restrict behavior associated with civil enforcement actions.⁵⁴

For example, the Fraud Section at the DOJ (DOJ Fraud) is responsible for bringing prosecutions against corporations for violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).⁵⁵ In the past decade, DOJ Fraud has employed a relatively aggressive enforcement strategy aimed at discouraging improper payments to foreign officials.⁵⁶ Many potential FCPA prosecutions, however, result in civil settlement agreements in the form of deferred or non-prosecution agreements, thereby making the Organizational Guidelines technically inapplicable. These civil settlement agreements often include a provision discussing the corporation's compliance program, but the discussion is often focused on the corporation's compliance with a specific legal area. For instance, in a deferred prosecution agreement between DOJ Fraud and Biomet, Inc. (Biomet), the company agreed to "continue to implement and maintain a compliance and ethics program designed to prevent and detect violations of the FCPA and other applicable anticorruption laws throughout its operations, including those of its affiliates, joint ventures, contractors, and subcontractors, with responsibilities that include interactions with foreign officials or other high-risk activities."⁵⁷ Thus, the enforcement action included the admonishments contained in the Organizational Guidelines, but it did so in a narrow manner that focused solely on ensuring that Biomet employed a compliance and ethics program

⁵³ See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 13, *United States v. ABB, Inc.*, No. H-10-664 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2010), ECF No. 12 (requiring ABB to "implement a compliance and ethics program designed to . . . prevent violations of the FCPA, U.S. commercial bribery laws, and all applicable foreign bribery laws").

⁵⁴ See DESIO, OVERVIEW, *supra* note 48 (explaining that the organizational sentencing guidelines apply when organizations engage in criminal conduct).

⁵⁵ See CRIM. DIV. U.S. DEPT JUST. & ENFORCEMENT DIV. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4 (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE].

⁵⁶ See, e.g., Veronica Root, *The Monitor-"Client" Relationship*, 100 VA. L. REV. 523, 540 (2014) [hereinafter Root, *Monitor-"Client"*]; F. Joseph Warin et al., *Somebody's Watching Me: FCPA Monitorships and How They Can Work Better*, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 321, 347-48 (2011).

⁵⁷ Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, *United States v. Biomet, Inc.*, No. 1:12-cr-00080 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2012), ECF No. 1-1.

that was designed to ensure that another FCPA or similar violation would not occur.

C. Pressure from Private Parties

In addition to direct governmental mandates and enforcement-related incentives to employ certain compliance programs, organizations must often find mechanisms to adopt compliance reforms in order to engage in certain business relationships with other private parties.⁵⁸ For example, Clorox has instituted a “Business Partner Code of Conduct,” which explains that it expects “the practices of [its] partners to reflect [Clorox’s] own.”⁵⁹ The code details “business practice standards for [Clorox’s] direct suppliers of goods, service providers, consultants, distributors, licensees, joint ventures, contractors and temporary workers.”⁶⁰ Clorox’s code provides general guidance on the importance of adhering to human rights requirements, safe working conditions, environmental regulations, and compliance with fair business practices and applicable laws.⁶¹ It then provides information on how to make inquiries regarding appropriate compliance with the code and then goes on to detail sanctions that could be levied against business partners for violating Clorox’s code.⁶² Specifically, the code states:

We may pursue legal or other sanctions against any business partners who violate the Code or applicable laws when conducting Clorox business. We may also immediately terminate the business relationship, and any related contracts, to the extent permitted by applicable laws. We may also choose, in our sole discretion, to enter into a remediation plan with non-compliant business partners, in which the business partner agrees to take corrective action to fix the business misconduct within a defined period of time.⁶³

Similarly, Oracle has a “Partner Code of Conduct and Business Ethics,” which is applicable to Oracle Partners, “resellers, and to all personnel employed by or engaged to provide services

⁵⁸ See Scott Killingsworth, *The Privatization of Compliance*, in TRANSFORMING COMPLIANCE 33, 33 (RAND Corp., 2014).

⁵⁹ THE CLOROX CO., BUSINESS PARTNER CODE OF CONDUCT 2 (2013).

⁶⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹ See *id.* at 4, 9–13.

⁶² *Id.* at 6–7.

⁶³ *Id.* at 7.

to [the Oracle Partner] throughout the world.”⁶⁴ Oracle’s code explicitly requires a heightened standard of conduct by its business partners, stating “[w]here local laws are less restrictive than this Code, [the Oracle Partner] must comply with the Code, even if [the Oracle Partner’s] conduct would otherwise be legal.”⁶⁵ The Oracle code is primarily concerned with activities that might violate requirements under the FCPA and similar laws, antitrust and competition laws, intellectual property rights, securities laws, and export control laws.⁶⁶ Oracle’s code also details mechanisms for reporting violations of the code.⁶⁷ It concludes by explaining that “[a]ny violation of this Code will constitute the basis for the immediate termination of [the Oracle Partner’s] distribution agreements with Oracle and the cancellation of any pending fees payable to [the Oracle Partner], pursuant to applicable laws and without any liability to Oracle.”⁶⁸

This type of private pressure for the adoption of compliance programs is necessary because companies are “increasingly accountable not only for their own compliance” but also that of their business partners, which motivates corporations to obtain contractual assurances that business partners are engaged in acceptable compliance practices.⁶⁹ Additionally, in some arenas, a “prerequisite for conventional access to capital” is the utilization of a system of compliance risk management.⁷⁰ Indeed, “corporate credit agreements and securities underwriting agreements commonly include additional representations and covenants that the borrower/issuer has ‘implemented and maintains policies and procedures designed to ensure, and

⁶⁴ ORACLE, PARTNER CODE OF CONDUCT AND BUSINESS ETHICS 2, <http://www.oracle.com/partners/en/how-to-do-business/opn-agreements-and-policies/019520.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/6R53-RWUA>].

⁶⁵ *Id.*

⁶⁶ *See id.* at 3–6.

⁶⁷ *See id.* at 7–8.

⁶⁸ *Id.* at 8.

⁶⁹ Killingsworth, *supra* note 58, at 33.

⁷⁰ *Id.* at 38. The government has made its preference for private parties to demand specific compliance requirements from their partners explicit in recent statements from senior government officials. *See, e.g.,* Stephen Dockery, *U.S. Justice Department Outlines Metrics for New Compliance Expert*, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2015, 11:27 AM), <http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/11/02/u-s-justice-department-outlines-metrics-for-new-compliance-expert/> [<https://perma.cc/2YSX-UUSS>] (explaining that metrics for determining when to charge a company criminally will include whether third parties are informed of compliance expectations).

which are reasonably expected to continue to ensure, compliance' with specified laws."⁷¹

Thus, the ad hoc system by which many private firms have instituted their compliance programs is motivated not only by governmental actors but also by private parties that have a sufficient amount of influence to encourage their business partners to adopt specific reforms as a condition of the business relationship.

* * *

Corporations today confront demands from a variety of sources to implement compliance programs that meet very specific requirements. Whether the pressure comes from a statute, regulation, prosecutor, or business partner, corporations that want to remain competitive must satisfy a number of different compliance priorities.⁷² And while the Organizational Guidelines provide a potentially strong incentive to encourage companies to employ comprehensive compliance programs, the impetus for developing or revamping compliance programs is often communicated to firms on an ad hoc basis that is tied to ensuring compliance with a specific area of the law.

Thus, it may be that corporations are being encouraged to implement piecemeal compliance programs at the possible expense of more comprehensive compliance efforts. Indeed, because corporations are often responding to the threat of sanction when engaging in reforms to their compliance programs, they may focus the majority of their efforts on areas where the firm deems itself vulnerable to receiving a sanction. The rationality of this approach becomes apparent when one looks at corporate repeat offenders more closely.

II

CORPORATE REPEAT OFFENDERS: A CASE STUDY

Governmental actors—both regulators and prosecutors—are often charged with evaluating the effectiveness of a corporation's compliance program when misconduct is discovered within a firm. This evaluation is necessary for determining an appropriate sanction to be levied against the firm engaged in misconduct.⁷³ Yet, as shown in this Part, governmental actors

⁷¹ Killingsworth, *supra* note 58, at 38.

⁷² See *id.* at 33–34.

⁷³ See DESIO, OVERVIEW, *supra* note 48 (explaining that the organizational sentencing guidelines incorporate “the preventive and deterrent aspects of systematic compliance programs”).

are often focused on discrete issues within firms' compliance programs, which allows firms to engage in multiple violations of legal and regulatory requirements without governmental consideration of whether firms should be treated as recidivists. Given the variety of potential violations that can occur within a firm and the number of governmental actors that investigate and prosecute such violations, gatekeepers within firms may have an incentive to prioritize complying with regulations on a piecemeal basis instead of considering the effectiveness of the firm's compliance program from a more comprehensive standpoint.

As this Part reveals, many corporate entities settling claims of misconduct in one area of law go on to settle allegations of corporate wrongdoing in another legal area. Using FCPA enforcement actions brought by DOJ Fraud as a starting point, this Part demonstrates that firms are sometimes treated as recidivists when they engage in multiple violations of a legal requirement investigated by the same governmental enforcement agent but are not treated as recidivists when subsequent violations of law are resolved with multiple governmental agencies or departments.

A. Methodology⁷⁴

The past decade saw a renewed effort to ensure companies adhere to the statutory requirements under the FCPA. As a result, FCPA enforcement actions have increased exponentially with high profile, governmental sanctions levied against companies in a variety of industries.⁷⁵ To determine how the government may be treating corporate repeat offenders, I began by identifying corporate entities that entered into deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, or guilty pleas settling FCPA violations with DOJ Fraud from 2004 to 2016.⁷⁶ I then reviewed other agency enforcement actions'

⁷⁴ See Appendices.

⁷⁵ See *FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions*, U.S. DEPT JUST., <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html> [<https://perma.cc/7VVF-WRJM>] (last updated Jan. 12, 2017) (providing a list of linked cases to related enforcement actions).

⁷⁶ I chose 2004 as a starting point, because it is generally understood as the time period that began robust FCPA enforcement by DOJ Fraud. See, e.g., Warin et al., *supra* note 56, at 325 (stating that 2007 saw a large increase in enforcement actions). One flaw that became apparent in this methodology is that companies in industries where FCPA violations apparently are less common were not captured in the research. For example, multinational bank HSBC has entered into several well-publicized settlement agreements with the SEC, DOJ, OFAC and the U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) since 2012. See News Release, Fed.

websites, including the DOJ Antitrust division,⁷⁷ SEC,⁷⁸ Federal Trade Commission,⁷⁹ Federal Communications Commission (FCC),⁸⁰ and Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Asset Control⁸¹ for unrelated settlement agreements with that company. I also conducted internet searches using the name of a company with at least one known FCPA violation and searched for the terms “settlement,” “fraud,” and “false claims.”

Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Announces Settlement with HSBC (Sept. 12, 2014), <http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-Settlement-with-HSBC.aspx> [<https://perma.cc/J97F-4MNX>]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Settles Civil Fraud Claims Against HSBC Bank for Failure to Monitor Fees Submitted for Foreclosure-Related Services (July 1, 2014), <http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July14/HSBCSettlementPR.php> [<https://perma.cc/325X-JNFC>]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit \$1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbh-holdings-plc-and-hsbc-bank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations> [<https://perma.cc/8GW4-S2KH>]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges HSBC's Swiss Private Banking Unit with Providing Unregistered Services to U.S. Clients (Nov. 25, 2014), <http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543534789#.VQhOXkKprzI> [<https://perma.cc/8KXD-HMVN>]; *HSBC Bank USA, N.A. Settles Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations*, OFF. OF FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL: ENFORCEMENT INFO., (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20131217_hsbh.pdf [<https://perma.cc/C2N7-W9EQ>]. However, since HSBC has not entered into a settlement related to FCPA, its repeated violations are not reflected in this section of the Article. A different data set could be created by using a different agency enforcement action's database as the starting point rather than the FCPA or by searching a regulatory news column such as the Wall Street Journal Risk and Compliance Journal. *Risk & Compliance Journal*, WALL STREET J., <http://www.wsj.com/news/risk-compliance-journal> [<https://perma.cc/5B9H-9ZBE>].

⁷⁷ *Antitrust Case Filings*, U.S. DEPT JUST., <http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/index.html#page=page-1> [<https://perma.cc/KYG2-5P6U>].

⁷⁸ *Administrative Proceedings*, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, <http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin.shtml> [<https://perma.cc/8FKZ-R4TH>] (last modified Mar. 10, 2017). A Google search of the company name and “SEC” or “SEC settlement” may be more effective as this database is less searchable than other databases.

⁷⁹ *Cases and Proceedings*, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, <https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings> [<https://perma.cc/BR63-D86Q>].

⁸⁰ *Enforcement Bureau*, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, <http://www.fcc.gov/enforcement-bureau> [<https://perma.cc/FY5E-FB69>] (last updated Mar. 3, 2017). A Google search of the company name and “FCC,” “FCC violation” or “FCC settlement” may be more effective, as this database is not as easily searched.

⁸¹ *Civil Penalties and Enforcement Information*, U.S. DEPT TREASURY, <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Pages/civpen-index2.aspx> [<https://perma.cc/BZ25-SRY2>]. A Google search of the company name and “OFAC,” “OFAC violation,” or “unauthorized export” may be more effective. See also *Enforcement*, U.S. DEPT COM.: BUREAU OF INDUSTRY & SECURITY, <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement> [<https://perma.cc/N8SU-JLY7>] (describing the Bureau of Industry and Security Export Enforcement's mission).

I found this to be the most effective way to find additional violations, particularly for False Claims Act violations.⁸²

B. High-Level Results

From 2004 to 2016, DOJ Fraud entered into deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, or guilty pleas with 159 separate companies.⁸³ These separate companies, however, are often related entities. When the related entities are treated as one corporate entity, ninety-four separate corporate entities are found to have entered into deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, or guilty pleas with DOJ Fraud from 2004 to 2016.⁸⁴ Of these ninety-four corporate entities, thirty-three involved a guilty plea to settle an alleged FCPA violation.⁸⁵ Of these thirty-three corporate entities that entered guilty pleas, one appeared twice due to multiple FCPA violations a few years apart; therefore, because tracking the repeat offenses for each appearance would result in double-counting, this effectively leaves thirty-two relevant corporate entities.⁸⁶ I focused on these thirty-two corporate entities when attempting to identify repeat offenses because if a company was required to enter into a guilty plea, as opposed to being allowed to enter into a civil enforcement action, it may signal more egregious or troubling misconduct.⁸⁷

⁸² The DOJ Civil Division prosecutes False Claims Act violations but does not appear to maintain an enforcement actions database, unlike other agencies. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Biomet Companies to Pay over \$6 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Concerning Bone Growth Stimulators (Oct. 29, 2014), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/biomet-companies-pay-over-6-million-resolve-false-claims-act-allegations-concerning-bone> [<https://perma.cc/4JS8-4VPR>] [hereinafter 2014 Biomet Press Release] (providing an example of an enforcement action under the False Claims Act).

⁸³ See *infra* app. A. There was an element of judgment in compiling the list of total companies entering into agreements because the identity of each corporation was not reported in a uniform fashion. Sometimes each subsidiary entering into an agreement with the DOJ was apparent in a press release, in other instances the information was located within the body of the agreement, and in still other examples the information was found in an appendix to the applicable agreement. As a result, the more reliable and replicable number is the corporate entity number.

⁸⁴ The vast majority of these ninety-four entities were identified by utilizing the "year" search function on the DOJ Fraud FCPA enforcement actions page. There were three companies from 2011, however, that were not properly tagged as occurring in that year. They were identified by going through the alphabetical list of enforcement actions on the DOJ Fraud website.

⁸⁵ See *infra* app. B.

⁸⁶ See *infra* app. C, entries ##1 & 15.

⁸⁷ See, e.g., RESOURCE GUIDE, *supra* note 55, at 52–53 (describing the considerations of DOJ prosecutions, including the history of the corporation's misconduct in other criminal, civil, or regulatory enforcement).

Of the thirty-two corporate entities that entered into guilty pleas to resolve alleged FCPA violations, twenty-two did not engage in additional instances of misconduct within a five-year period of the relevant FCPA offense.⁸⁸ This yielded a data set⁸⁹ of ten corporate entities that have settled multiple allegations of FCPA violations or settled FCPA violations and settled charges of unrelated, unlawful conduct under a different statute within a relatively short period (generally five years). The case study analyzes these ten corporate entities in an effort to glean insight regarding repeat misconduct by corporate entities.

C. Multiple Offense Categories

Among the ten firms identified, similarities emerged where the unrelated settlements concern violations: (i) with the same or similar unlawful objectives and behavior, (ii) with the same or similar unlawful behavior but dissimilar unlawful objectives, and (iii) that do not share any characteristics in terms of the type of unlawful behavior or unlawful purpose. Concerns regarding possible corporate recidivist conduct are most apparent for the first category of firms and look to be inapposite for those in the third category.

1. *Category 1: Same or Similar Unlawful Behavior and Unlawful Purpose*

The two corporate entities in this category—Hewlett-Packard and Marubeni—were involved in repeated violations that shared the same or similar unlawful behavior and unlawful purpose. Hewlett-Packard entered into settlement agreements to resolve charges of bribery or improper payments under the FCPA and entered settlements related to entirely separate instances of paying customer kickbacks, such as improper payments or other unlawful inducements in violation of the Anti-Kickbacks Act, the False Claims Act, and related fraud regulations. Marubeni entered into two settlement agreements to resolve charges of bribery under the FCPA without committing violations of other regulatory or legal areas. This section discusses the Hewlett-Packard violations, as they demonstrate the challenge with deterring similar misconduct when it falls under diverse regulatory areas.

⁸⁸ See *infra* app. C.

⁸⁹ See *infra* app. C.

Hewlett-Packard entered into three settlement agreements from 2010 to 2014 to resolve different instances of improper payments. Specifically, in August 2010, Hewlett-Packard agreed to pay \$55 million to settle charges that it “knowingly paid kickbacks, or ‘influencer fees,’ to systems integrator companies in return for recommendations that federal agencies purchase [Hewlett-Packard’s] products.”⁹⁰ That settlement agreement also covered allegations that Hewlett-Packard had submitted defective pricing under government contracts.⁹¹ Then, in November 2010, Hewlett-Packard entered into a \$16.25 million agreement with the FCC to settle charges that it had provided improper inducement and gratuities to school officials in the Houston and Dallas Independent School Districts while it was also bidding on contracts to supply equipment to the school districts under the FCC E-Rate program.⁹² “Meals and entertainment—including trips on a yacht and tickets to the 2004 Super Bowl—were provided by the contractors to get inside information and win contracts that were supposed to be awarded through a competitive bidding process.”⁹³ This behavior violated the FCC’s competitive bidding rules.⁹⁴ Finally, in 2014, Hewlett-Packard and its subsidiaries agreed for the subsidiaries to plead guilty to bribery of Russian officials and to pay more than \$108 million to settle allegations that subsidiaries in Russia, Poland, and Mexico made unlawful facilitating payments or paid bribes to public officials to win contracts, which violated the FCPA.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Agrees to Pay the United States \$55 Million to Settle Allegations of Fraud (Aug. 30, 2010), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-agrees-pay-united-states-55-million-settle-allegations-fraud> [<https://perma.cc/8FFB-WN9X>] [hereinafter HP Fraud Press Release].

⁹¹ *Id.*

⁹² Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Settles Lawsuits Against Hewlett-Packard and Intervenes Against Its Business Partners for Violating FCC Competitive Bidding Rules in Texas (Nov. 10, 2010), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-settles-lawsuits-against-hewlett-packard-and-intervenes-against-its-business-partners> [<https://perma.cc/9LYQ-KK4X>] [hereinafter HP Bid Rigging Press Release].

⁹³ Press Release, Fed. Comm’n Comm’n, HP to Pay \$16.25 million to Settle DOJ-FCC E-Rate Fraud (Nov. 10, 2010), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-302764A1.pdf [<https://perma.cc/G5S2-X69P>].

⁹⁴ HP Bid Rigging Press Release, *supra* note 92.

⁹⁵ Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery (Apr. 9, 2014), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-russia-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery> [<https://perma.cc/3STH-Z9TM>]. Hewlett-Packard, the parent company, did not enter into a plea agreement with DOJ Fraud, but it did enter into a settlement with the SEC and agreed to pay \$31,472,250 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. *Id.*

In each instance, employees gave unlawful payments or gifts with the purpose of inducing the recipients to award Hewlett-Packard business opportunities. Hewlett-Packard was not, however, treated as a recidivist in any of the plea or settlement agreements. Indeed, in determining the appropriate fine for Hewlett-Packard's 2014 FCPA violation, the DOJ included two mitigating factors to support the imposition of a fine that was less than the minimum fine calculated under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, "the misconduct . . . was largely undertaken by employees associated with [Hewlett-Packard's Russian subsidiary], which employed a small fraction of [Hewlett-Packard's] global workforce[.]" and "neither [Hewlett-Packard] nor the [Russian subsidiary] ha[d] previously been the subject of any criminal enforcement action by the [DOJ] or law enforcement authority in Russia or elsewhere."⁹⁶ While it is true that Hewlett-Packard's alleged E-Rate fraud and alleged violation of the False Claims Act in 2010 were both civil offenses, not criminal offenses, in all three instances Hewlett-Packard employees paid unlawful bribes or other inducements to win contracts. The offenses fall under three different regulations—the False Claims Act, the FCC's competitive bidding rules, and the FCPA—and the 2010 and 2014 offenses were prosecuted by different divisions of the DOJ—the Civil Division in 2010 and the Criminal Division in 2014—yet there are clear similarities in both the manner and goal of Hewlett-Packard's misconduct.

It may seem as if the examples of Hewlett-Packard and Marubeni's repeat misconduct, which are characterized as having the same or similar unlawful behavior and unlawful purpose, are flukes and not representative of a more concerning trend. As such, it is important to note that if the case study were expanded to include companies entering into deferred or

⁹⁶ Plea Agreement at 17, *United States v. ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O.*, No. 5:14-cr-00201 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014), <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/hewlett-packard-zao/hp-russia-plea-agreement.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/6LFP-ZA6H>]. This factor was mentioned only in HP's Russian subsidiary's plea agreement. The settlement agreements covering the Polish and Mexican subsidiaries do not contain any language to this effect. See *Deferred Prosecution Agreement*, *United States v. Hewlett-Packard Polska, SP. Z O.O.*, No. 5:14-cr-00202 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014), <http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/hewlett-packard-polska/hp-poland-dpa.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/EFM5-U59T>]; Letter from Melinda Haag, United States Attorney et al. to F. Joseph Warin, Counsel for Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. (Apr. 9, 2014), <http://fcpa.stanford.edu/fcpac/documents/3000/002202.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/HD57-PW88>].

non-prosecution agreements with DOJ Fraud, other examples similar to those of Hewlett-Packard become apparent.⁹⁷

2. *Category 2: Similarities in Unlawful Behavior but Not Unlawful Purpose*

The second category of repeat offenders contains two corporate entities that entered into settlement agreements regarding unlawful conduct where the goals of the conduct were different between the two settlements, but the manner of behavior was similar. Specifically, ABB, Inc.⁹⁸ and Bridgestone

⁹⁷ For example, in 2011, Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay \$21.4 million as part of a settlement agreement to resolve charges claiming that its subsidiaries had violated the FCPA by making improper payments to government officials in Greece, Poland, and Romania and paying kickbacks under the United Nations Oil for Food Program. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Johnson & Johnson Agrees to Pay \$21.4 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Oil for Food Investigations (Apr. 8, 2011), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-agrees-pay-214-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act> [https://perma.cc/SFJ6-XULH]. In 2013, Johnson & Johnson entered into a \$2.2 billion settlement agreement to resolve criminal and civil charges of health care fraud, including paying kickbacks to physicians to induce them to prescribe medications that had been unlawfully misbranded and to pharmacies to encourage pharmacists to promote the use of Johnson & Johnson's pharmaceuticals. These improper payments resulted in the submission of false claims to federal health care programs, making Johnson & Johnson liable under the False Claims Act. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Johnson & Johnson to Pay More than \$2.2 Billion to Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov. 4, 2013), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-pay-more-22-billion-resolve-criminal-and-civil-investigations> [https://perma.cc/4C46-RPEG]. In both cases, Johnson & Johnson employees made unlawful payments to facilitate broader use of their products or to secure contracts. Yet the settlement agreements concerning the civil charges, including the charges of improper payments and inducements, contain no consideration of Johnson & Johnson's previous violations. See *id.*

Biomet serves as yet another example of this type of repeat corporate misconduct. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, *United States v. Biomet, Inc.*, No. 1:12-cr-00080 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2012), ECF No. 1-1; Settlement Agreement between the United States of America and Biomet, Inc. at 1, *United States v. Biomet Orthopedics, Inc.*, No. 07-8133, 2007 WL 2964201 (D. N.J. Sept. 27, 2007), <http://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nj/Press/files/pdf/Files/Older/BiometCivilSettlement.pdf> [https://perma.cc/VTZ9-MAAJ]; U.S. DEP'T JUST., CORPORATE INTEGRITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN OIG-HHS AND BIOMET, INC. 19, 31 (2007), <http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-nj/legacy/2013/11/29/BiometCIA92707.pdf> [https://perma.cc/YAL4-PXYL]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Five Companies in Hip and Knee Replacement Industry Avoid Prosecution by Agreeing to Compliance Rules and Monitoring (Sept. 27, 2007), <http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-nj/legacy/2013/11/29/hips0927.rel.pdf> [https://perma.cc/Z6G3-YLVF]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Third Medical Device Company Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Mar. 26, 2012), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/third-medical-device-company-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation> [https://perma.cc/7YSS-2SE6].

⁹⁸ See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Bid Rigging on USAID Construction Contract in Egypt

Corporation (Bridgestone)⁹⁹ each entered into settlement agreements related to FCPA violations and, separately, for engaging in anticompetitive behavior in violation of the Sherman Act. The underlying unlawful behavior in these instances was similar in that for both the FCPA and the antitrust violations the firms were involved in conspiracies with other entities to achieve unlawful objectives. However, the unlawful purpose for the FCPA and antitrust violations differed. In the case of the FCPA violations, the firms were attempting to obtain a competitive advantage over their competitors, but in the case of the antitrust violations, the purpose of the conspiracy was to work with competitors to protect profits through bid rigging, price-fixing, and agreeing not to compete for certain business.¹⁰⁰

Interestingly, in separate enforcement actions, each corporate entity was treated as a recidivist for repeated violations under the FCPA or antitrust regulations, but the recidivism treatment only occurred when appearing before the same governmental actor on a second occasion.¹⁰¹ For example, when Bridgestone pleaded guilty in October 2011 to engaging in

(Apr. 12, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2001/7984.pdf [<https://perma.cc/V6NE-B7SM>]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, ABB Ltd and Two Subsidiaries Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Will Pay \$19 Million in Criminal Penalties (Sept. 29, 2010), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/abb-ltd-and-two-subsidiaries-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-will-pay> [<https://perma.cc/ZN4S-VRSP>].

⁹⁹ See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bridgestone Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty to Participating in Conspiracies to Rig Bids and Bribe Foreign Government Officials (Sept. 15, 2011), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bridgestone-corporation-agrees-plead-guilty-participating-conspiracies-rig-bids-and-bribe-0> [perma.cc/28LT-88TV] [hereinafter *Bridgestone 2011 Press Release*]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bridgestone Corp. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Price Fixing on Automobile Parts Installed in U.S. Cars (Feb. 13, 2014), <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bridgestone-corp-agrees-plead-guilty-price-fixing-automobile-parts-installed-us-cars> [<https://perma.cc/HN8W-PZDZ>] [hereinafter *Bridgestone 2014 Press Release*].

¹⁰⁰ There is, of course, similarity in unlawful purpose in that the FCPA and antitrust conspiracies were both engaged in to achieve greater profits. Obtaining increased profits, however, is typically what motivates corporate misconduct. As Professor Geoffrey P. Miller has explained, "illegal behavior might increase rather than reduce profits." Miller, *Compliance Function*, *supra* note 32, at 6.

¹⁰¹ As with the Category 1 offense type, if the data set were expanded to include deferred and non-prosecution agreements, additional corporate entities would be identified that would also fit within Category 2. See, e.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. Akzo Nobel Chems. Intern'l B.V., No. 06-0160 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2006) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f216300/216369.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/6WAW-96J9>]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't Justice, Akzo Nobel Acknowledges Improper Payments Made by Its Subsidiaries to Iraqi Government Under the U.N. Oil for Food Program, Enters Agreement with Department of Justice (Dec. 20, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/December/07_crm_1024.html [<https://perma.cc/2UFU-D4W5>].

price-fixing within the marine hose industry, as well as to the FCPA violations, it failed to disclose that it had also participated in an anti-vibration rubber parts conspiracy.¹⁰² When Bridgestone's additional anticompetitive behavior was discovered in 2014, it was sanctioned for not disclosing the misconduct in 2011.¹⁰³ A DOJ Antitrust official stated that, "[t]he Antitrust Division will take a hard line when repeat offenders fail to disclose additional anticompetitive behavior."¹⁰⁴ Thus, participating in multiple violations of the same underlying statute triggered mention that the firm was a repeat offender, but as is shown in the Category 1 discussion, corporate entities that violated different underlying statutes are often not treated as repeat offenders.¹⁰⁵

3. *Category 3: No Similarities in Unlawful Behavior or Purpose*

Six corporate entities engaged in multiple violations in compliance areas that were unrelated in both unlawful purpose and manner of misconduct. For example, BAE Systems settled multiple incidents of unrelated misconduct from 2010 to 2015, including alleged violations of the FCPA¹⁰⁶ and the

¹⁰² *Bridgestone 2014 Press Release*, *supra* note 99.

¹⁰³ *See Bridgestone 2011 Press Release*, *supra* note 99; *Bridgestone 2014 Press Release*, *supra* note 99.

¹⁰⁴ *Bridgestone 2014 Press Release*, *supra* note 99 (quoting Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division).

¹⁰⁵ It should be noted that the enforcement strategy at DOJ Antitrust is substantively different than that of other law enforcement agencies because it has traditionally "place[d] little emphasis on the importance of an effective compliance program to prevent cartel behavior." Joseph Murphy & William Kolasky, *The Role of Anti-Cartel Compliance Programs in Preventing Cartel Behavior*, 26 ANTITRUST 61, 63 (2012) http://summerconvention.utahbar.org/2014/materials/H2_Cartel%20Compliance%20Programs.pdf [<https://perma.cc/XZ3B-ZBZX>]. Indeed, while "the U.S. Attorneys' Manual instruct[s] federal prosecutors to consider compliance programs, the Antitrust Division obtained a complete carve-out for itself." *Id.* (footnotes omitted). Recent scholarship has, however, noted a recent shift in antitrust policy towards a greater emphasis on the importance of adopting and maintaining a robust compliance program. D. Daniel Sokol, *Antitrust Compliance*, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 155, 155 (Michael A. Hitt et al. eds., 2016).

¹⁰⁶ Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay \$400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine> [<https://perma.cc/MYS2-ULUC>].

False Claims Act,¹⁰⁷ as well as allegations of wrongful discrimination¹⁰⁸ and violations of the Arms Export Control Act.¹⁰⁹

* * *

The importance of the above categories should not be overblown, and the findings of the case study could be reframed as demonstrating a continuum upon which corporate repeat misconduct of differing severity falls. The upshot, however, is that firms in the above case study with multiple violations in different statutory or compliance areas have not been treated as recidivists, despite, in some instances, similarities in their unlawful behavior and unlawful purposes across multiple violations. And the firms with repeated violations that have been identified as recidivists have only been identified as such when appearing before the same governmental actor on multiple occasions.¹¹⁰

There could be a number of plausible reasons for the government's failure to sanction repeat corporate misconduct. As explained in Part I, different governmental actors handle different types of statutory and regulatory violations in a piecemeal fashion. Additionally, the government currently does not seem to track recidivist behavior across diverse statutory or regulatory areas. Moreover, the government does not employ an enforcement strategy that permits it to levy heightened sanctions against firms that engage in repeated instances of legal violations across diverse regulatory or statutory areas. These choices with regard to the government's enforcement strategy, however, may reflect information, coordination, or responsibility challenges, rather than signaling a strategy of purposeful non-enforcement.

¹⁰⁷ Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Defense Contractors Settle Alleged Violation of the False Claims Act for \$5.5 Million (Sept. 16, 2014), <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/defense-contractors-settle-alleged-violation-false-claims-act-55-million> [<https://perma.cc/2XRU-H7BQ>].

¹⁰⁸ Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Virginia-Based BAE Systems Ship Repair Inc. (Dec. 28, 2011), <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-virginia-based-bae-systems-ship-repair-inc> [<https://perma.cc/GK7U-6YTG>].

¹⁰⁹ Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, BAE Systems plc Enters Civil Settlement of Alleged Violations of the AECA and ITAR and Agrees to Civil Penalty of \$79 Million (May 17, 2011), https://www.foley.com/files/BAES_StateDeptRelease18may11.pdf [<https://perma.cc/53EP-2U73>].

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 11 United States v. ABB Inc., No. H-10-664 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2010), ECF No. 12 (appearing twice before the DOJ); *Bridgestone 2014 Press Release*, *supra* note 99 (appearing twice before the DOJ).

III COORDINATING COMPLIANCE INCENTIVES

Parts I and II have established that current regulatory and enforcement priorities have led to a system of piecemeal compliance that fails to address firms that engage in repeated instances of misconduct. This Part begins by explaining how information, coordination, and identified responsibility challenges may contribute, at least partially, to the government's failure to recognize and sanction repeat corporate misconduct. The Part then argues that efforts to improve corporate compliance incentives would benefit from regulatory mechanisms that (i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist behavior across diverse regulatory areas and (ii) aggressively sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. The Part next provides a proposal for reform, which utilizes existing reporting obligations, a new compliance officer model within the DOJ, and the Organizational Guidelines.

A. Information, Coordination, and Identified Responsibility Challenges

Governmental enforcement agencies and actors are also subject to the information and coordination complexities that confront many regulatory agencies within the current administrative state. Importantly, these information and coordination challenges may lead to a responsibility vacuum when considering issues of corporate recidivists.

The first challenge is the interagency coordination problem.¹¹¹ "Congress often assigns more than one agency the same or similar functions or divides authority among multiple agencies, giving each responsibility for part of a larger whole."¹¹² When scholars consider these problems, they typically focus on the fact that multiple agencies deal with the same basic legal area or problem.¹¹³ As a result, the traditional concern regarding interagency coordination is with "overlapping delegations of power"¹¹⁴ and, for purposes of this Article, the redundancies that overlapping authority can create within enforcement efforts.¹¹⁵ For example, both DOJ Fraud and the SEC have authority to sanction companies for FCPA viola-

¹¹¹ See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, *Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space*, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2012).

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ See *id.*

¹¹⁴ *Id.*

¹¹⁵ *Id.* at 1135.

tions.¹¹⁶ As a result, many FCPA violations result in sanctions from both governmental entities, which necessarily require sharing of information and procedural coordination between the two governmental actors.¹¹⁷ For areas of law where inter-agency coordination has been readily identified, there have been efforts by governmental agents to cooperate with each other. For example, in response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, an interagency task force was created which included representatives from the DOJ, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the SEC.¹¹⁸ Similarly, the DOJ's Environment and Natural Resources Division often partners with the Environmental Protection Agency and state and local officials when prosecuting pollution and wildlife crimes and pursuing civil enforcement actions.¹¹⁹

The interagency coordination problem may arise differently than how it is traditionally viewed, however, because of the numerous governmental agencies and actors responsible for sanctioning corporate misconduct as segmented participants in a larger governmental enforcement strategy. Agencies that might not be considered to have overlapping zones of authority may in fact have an element of shared enforcement space because they may both need to sanction the same organization for engaging in corporate misconduct. For example, the FCC requires companies to comply with certain competitive bidding rules domestically, while the FCPA prohibits bribery of foreign officials.¹²⁰ The shared regulatory space of the two governmental actors is not necessarily apparent when one focuses in on the discrete statutory and regulatory area each actor is responsible for enforcing. But in practice, both the FCC and FCPA may end up sanctioning an organization for engaging in unlaw-

¹¹⁶ SALEN CHURI ET AL., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A PRACTICAL PRIMER 3 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/FCPA_Compliance_Report.authcheckdam.pdf [<https://perma.cc/ATQ8-JSWA>].

¹¹⁷ See, e.g., Warin et al., *supra* note 56, at 328-37 (discussing FCPA enforcement actions brought from 2004-2011 and highlighting when those actions were brought by the SEC, DOJ, or both enforcement actors).

¹¹⁸ Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, President Obama Establishes Interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Nov. 17, 2009) <https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-249.htm> [<https://perma.cc/32CP-MC6G>]. The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force replaced the Corporate Fraud Task Force, which was established in 2002. *Id.*

¹¹⁹ *About the Division*, U.S. DEP'T JUST.: ENV'T & NAT. RESOURCES DIVISION, <https://www.justice.gov/enrd/about-division> [<https://perma.cc/J95N-QV8P>].

¹²⁰ See *supra* section II.C.1.

ful bribery activities.¹²¹ This raises the question of when, if ever, it might be appropriate for seemingly diverse regulatory agencies to share information about corporate misconduct and sanctions in an effort to ensure that private firms have the proper incentives to deter repeat corporate misconduct and adopt the “effective compliance and ethics program” outlined in the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and espoused by senior governmental officials. Traditional attempts at improving interagency coordination have focused on the initial enforcement action or prosecution and not on recidivist conduct, which makes tackling the issue of repeat corporate misconduct a unique issue in need of further consideration.

The second challenge is intra-agency coordination. Agency heads, “as opposed to Congress[,]” are responsible for “design[ing] internal structures and processes to further their own regulatory agendas.”¹²² Thus, while Congress delegates authority to the SEC to protect investors,¹²³ the agency itself makes decisions about its own organizational structure and processes.¹²⁴ Agencies that are responsible for corporations’ compliance with certain legal and regulatory requirements routinely have to work through various intra-agency coordination problems. The DOJ, however, presents a unique challenge.

The DOJ is a cabinet-level agency,¹²⁵ which is made up of a variety of traditional administrative agencies.¹²⁶ The DOJ is responsible for handling “all criminal prosecutions and civil suits in which the United States ha[s] an interest,” but it does so through an organizational structure that includes “various components, offices, boards and divisions.”¹²⁷ Thus, the intra-agency coordination challenges facing the DOJ are highly com-

¹²¹ *Id.*

¹²² Jennifer Nou, *Intra-Agency Coordination*, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 429 (2015).

¹²³ *What We Do*, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION, <http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml> [<https://perma.cc/E3FR-RPUA>] (last modified June 10, 2013).

¹²⁴ See, e.g., *Delegation of Authority to the Director of its Division of Enforcement*, 76 Fed. Reg. 35,348, 35,348 (June 17, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200) (outlining the SEC’s amendment of its internal rules to delegate authority to issue witness immunity orders to the SEC Director of the Division of Enforcement).

¹²⁵ *See Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Overview*, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Oct. 16, 2015), <http://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual-overview> [<https://perma.cc/J6EE-EHH9>].

¹²⁶ See, e.g., *Rules and Regulations*, BUREAU ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, <https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations> [<https://perma.cc/35HR-79DG>] (explaining that “federal agencies such as ATF” must engage in public rulemaking).

¹²⁷ *About DOJ*, U.S. DEP’T JUST., <http://www.justice.gov/about> [<https://perma.cc/4N97-EUAZ>].

plex and, in some instances, include what look more like inter-agency coordination issues. On a more basic level, however, the DOJ also determines how to coordinate enforcement actions and it has done so through a variety of specialized divisions. These specialized divisions, like DOJ Antitrust and DOJ Fraud, are faced with information and coordination problems when both divisions have the opportunity or responsibility to bring enforcement actions against the same organization for misconduct.¹²⁸ They can properly address the violations as separate instances of misconduct without engaging in information sharing and coordination between divisions, but they can also choose to work in a more cooperative manner, particularly as it pertains to corporate repeat offenders.

The third challenge is a potential responsibility vacuum. When multiple agencies or divisions are responsible for maintaining enforcement actions against the same company, they tend to focus on their particular grant of authority. DOJ Antitrust focuses on ensuring that companies are not engaged in anticompetitive behavior,¹²⁹ while the SEC ensures that public companies comply with the securities laws.¹³⁰ But that leaves open the question of which, if any, enforcement actor or agency should be concerned when a company is engaged in repeated instances of organizational misconduct across diverse regulatory areas.

B. Greater Detection & Increased Sanctions

Given current regulatory and enforcement behavior of governmental actors, compliance personnel within private firms have strong incentives to ensure that a company that is found to have engaged in a particular type of misconduct, such as improper bribery of officials in an effort to obtain favorable contracts, does not participate in future, similar misconduct.¹³¹ Those responsible for effectuating the firm's compliance program have a strong incentive to revamp and bolster efforts to ensure the firm's long-term compliance with the particular regulatory or statutory requirement that led to the firm receiving a governmental sanction.¹³² For example, in 2012,

¹²⁸ See *supra* section II.C.2.

¹²⁹ See *Mission*, U.S. DEP'T JUST.: ANTITRUST DIVISION, <https://www.justice.gov/atr/mission> [<https://perma.cc/TYU5-QXMV>] (last updated July 20, 2015).

¹³⁰ See *supra* note 123.

¹³¹ See *supra* subpart II.C.

¹³² See generally Miller, *Economic Analysis*, *supra* note 26, at 9–18 (using economics to demonstrate why firms have strong incentives to stay in compliance).

Biomet entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ and SEC to resolve allegations that it violated the FCPA¹³³ and agreed to retain a compliance monitor.¹³⁴ Two years later, Biomet disclosed possible further FCPA violations, which occurred both before and after Biomet entered into the 2012 deferred prosecution agreement. After a period of investigation, the DOJ “informed Biomet that the [deferred prosecution agreement] and the independent compliance monitor’s appointment [would be] extended for an additional year.”¹³⁵ Thus, Biomet received an additional set of sanctions due to its failure to effectively address flaws within its FCPA compliance program.

Compliance personnel, however, have less of an incentive to conduct a systematic overhaul or audit of the firm’s entire compliance program in response to legally diverse instances of misconduct. For example, HSBC’s conduct over the past several years has garnered a great deal of attention within certain segments of the media, yet it has not been the subject of additional sanctions based on its recidivist conduct.¹³⁶ Indeed, in 2012, a Senate subcommittee conducted a highly critical investigation of HSBC, which resulted in a 339-page report that determined that the bank repeatedly failed to detect international money laundering, connections to terrorist financing, and violations of U.S. economic and trade sanctions.¹³⁷ Yet even this strong evidence of significant compliance failures within HSBC has not prompted governmental actors to treat HSBC as a recidivist and require it to engage in a systematic, comprehensive overhaul of its compliance programs and policies.¹³⁸

Thus, compliance personnel that serve as gatekeepers within firms currently have weak incentives to focus on comprehensive compliance overhauls. In particular, while firms

¹³³ Biomet, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/351346/000090342315000219/biomet-8k_0317.htm [<https://perma.cc/76ZT-95M2>] [hereinafter Biomet Form 8-K]; see also Samuel Rubinfeld, *The Morning Risk Report: Biomet Hit by Recidivism*, WALL STREET J.: RISK COMPLIANCE J. (Mar. 19, 2015, 7:24 AM) <http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/03/19/the-morning-risk-report-biomet-hit-by-bribery-recidivism/> [<https://perma.cc/DVE6-TXXX>].

¹³⁴ See Veronica Root, *Modern-Day Monitorships*, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 122–23 (2016) [hereinafter Root, *Modern-Day Monitorships*] (discussing the rise of monitorships and resulting differences amongst monitorship types).

¹³⁵ Biomet Form 8-K, *supra* note 133.

¹³⁶ See *supra* Introduction.

¹³⁷ See S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, *supra* note 15.

¹³⁸ See *id.*

rely heavily on corporate “gatekeepers” to prevent and detect compliance failures,¹³⁹ they are also rational actors that respond to possible monetary fines as well as to the probability that the government will levy such fines.¹⁴⁰ By treating corporate misconduct across legal areas as separate and distinct violations, governmental actors may be missing an opportunity to make repeated violations more costly to corporations. As a result, it may be that government regulators should consider increasing the sanctions for corporate repeat offenders. Increasing sanctions may result in more desirable incentives for corporate wrongdoers to engage in more effective self-policing through improved internal compliance programs.¹⁴¹

Classic law and economics literature regarding deterrence, however, assumes that “sanctioning repeat offenders more severely cannot be socially advantageous if deterrence always induces first-best behavior.”¹⁴² In those instances, “[r]aising the sanction because of [the repeat offender’s] record of prior convictions would overdeter [the repeat offender] now.”¹⁴³ Implicit, however, in this view of deterrence is that the government has chosen an appropriate sanction for corporate misconduct, when in reality the state will often “tolerate some underdeterrence in order to reduce enforcement expenses.”¹⁴⁴

This reality is unsurprising when one considers that law and economics theory has explained that strict liability enforcement, while the best regime “for inducing firms to sanction culpable agents,”¹⁴⁵ “may actually deter firms from monitoring, investigating, or reporting” corporate misconduct.¹⁴⁶ A private

¹³⁹ Root, *Modern-Day Monitorships*, *supra* note 134, at 118–19.

¹⁴⁰ Miller, *Economic Analysis*, *supra* note 26, at 9.

¹⁴¹ Recent scholarship, however, has suggested that the use of deferred or non-prosecution agreements and similar prosecutorial mandates should be imposed “only on firms with policing deficiencies attributable to ‘policing agency costs,’” which are “costs [that] arise when the firm’s senior managers or board of directors personally benefit from either wrongdoing or deficient corporate policing.” Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, *Corporate Governance Regulation Through Non-Prosecution*, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833902. This scholarship, however, has not specifically addressed the situation of corporate repeat offenders and whether instances of similar, repeat misconduct might warrant a different type of governmental enforcement strategy.

¹⁴² A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, *The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law*, in *HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS* 403, 438 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).

¹⁴³ *Id.*

¹⁴⁴ *Id.*

¹⁴⁵ Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, *Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes*, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 701 (1997).

¹⁴⁶ *Id.* at 707.

firm subject to a strict liability regime will have a decreased incentive to detect misconduct within its organization because it will definitively result in a sanction for the firm without consideration of the corporation's actions or culpability.

The upshot is that achieving perfect compliance with legal and regulatory requirements within private firms may actually deter those firms from implementing effective compliance and ethics programs, and thus the government chooses not to hold corporations responsible for obtaining perfect compliance, thereby creating a world where there is underdeterrence.

[As such,] making sanctions depend on offense history may be beneficial for two reasons. First, the use of offense history may create an additional incentive not to violate the law: if detection of a violation implies not only an immediate sanction, but also a higher sanction for a future violation, [a repeat offender] will be deterred more from committing a violation presently. Second, making sanctions depend on offense history allows society to take advantage of information about the dangerousness of [repeat offenders] and the need to deter them.¹⁴⁷

Thus, if the government treated a firm that engaged in repeat offenses within a specified period as a recidivist subject to a heightened sanction regime, the government could address challenges associated with underdeterrence and make non-compliance with legal and regulatory requirements a greater priority for the firm. A simple economic analysis of the compliance function would "[a]ssume that employees in a rational, profit-maximizing, risk-neutral firm engage in random illegal on-the-job conduct. The government imposes a fine ϵ on the firm for proven violations, which is administered with probability ρ . The firm [thus] experiences a sanction $\rho\epsilon$ for violations."¹⁴⁸ If governmental actors increase both the probability of and the amount of a potential fine or other penalty, they can effectively increase the sanction of compliance for both variables, thereby making recidivist behavior a particularly costly endeavor for the firm.

In short, efforts to improve corporate compliance may benefit from coordinated regulatory mechanisms that (i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist behavior across diverse regulatory areas and (ii) aggressively sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. By increasing the recognition of firms engaged in recidivist conduct, governmental actors could

¹⁴⁷ Polinsky & Shavell, *supra* note 142, at 438–39 (footnote omitted).

¹⁴⁸ Miller, *Economic Analysis*, *supra* note 26, at 9.

increase the probability that a sanction might be levied against the institution. By increasing the amount of monetary fines or other penalties that a firm faces when it engages in recidivist conduct, governmental actors can increase the “costs” of misconduct to the organization and encourage it to consider restructuring its entire compliance program. Employing such a strategy would not be an effort meant to achieve perfect deterrence, but it instead would be a method of strengthening the government’s current deterrence strategy by taking into account the practical reality that the government’s current enforcement regime does not in fact result in “perfect” deterrence and instead sometimes underdeters corporate misconduct.

C. A Proposal for Reform

There are likely a variety of mechanisms that governmental actors can employ to increase the probability of detection or the potential fine or other penalties for organizations that engage in recidivist conduct. This Article proposes mechanisms aimed to make recidivism more costly within private firms, and these proposals rely upon tools that are already available to governmental actors.¹⁴⁹ The proposal outlined below could be implemented almost immediately, without the need for Congress to pass a statute or for a regulator to engage in a lengthy notice-and-comment rulemaking process.

1. *Proposal for Increasing Detection of Recidivist Behavior*

When the DOJ informed Biomet that it would be requiring the deferred prosecution agreement and appointment of the compliance monitor to be extended for another year, Biomet, on the same day, reported this information to the SEC via Form 8-K.¹⁵⁰ The SEC requires public companies to file a variety of reports. Form 10-K is an annual filing and Form 10-Q is a

¹⁴⁹ There are, however, arguments opposed to the idea that imposing more severe sanctions will assist in deterring corporate misconduct. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, *Too Vast to Succeed*, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1109, 1134 (2016) (reviewing Garrett, *supra* note 3) (“If you want to condemn corporate offenders, encourage internal reform, and improve corporate culture, then perhaps you should do less. Enact narrower theories of corporate criminal liability; devise laws and guidelines that constrain prosecutorial *and* judicial discretion; and impose collateral consequences only in response to a predefined set of circumstances”); Griffith, *supra* note 24, at 2134 (“Getting the government out of the compliance business would prevent core corporate governance functions from being designed in an opaque process by a largely unaccountable agent with no expertise in organizational design and no ability to measure effectiveness.”).

¹⁵⁰ Biomet Form 8-K, *supra* note 133.

quarterly filing.¹⁵¹ The SEC, however, requires public companies to “report certain material corporate events on a more current basis.”¹⁵² “Form 8-K is the ‘current report’ companies must file with the SEC to announce major events that shareholders should know about.”¹⁵³ Thus, Biomet’s filing of a Form 8-K on the day that the DOJ informed it that it would be subject to another year under the deferred prosecution agreement and monitorship was not an accident. It was a requirement.

All public companies that enter into agreements to resolve allegations of misconduct with governmental actors are required to file a Form 8-K disclosing the event to shareholders. The disclosures would also be found within the firm’s quarterly 10-Q or annual 10-K, but the disclosure would be amongst other required filing information. The Form 8-K, however, is limited to discussions of current events; thus, when they are filed, it becomes readily apparent to those reviewing the document what “major events” triggered the form’s filing.¹⁵⁴

Government actors could implement a policy of reviewing Form 8-Ks as a mechanism for detecting recidivist behavior by firms. This system could be operationalized in a number of ways, but a new officer within the DOJ provides a model for how the DOJ could improve inter- and intra-agency coordination with regards to corporate recidivism.

In September 2015, the DOJ announced that it was “creating a new compliance counsel position in the Criminal Division to assess the effectiveness of an entity’s compliance program and help prosecutors decide whether or how to charge an entity under investigation.”¹⁵⁵ One key component of the new coun-

¹⁵¹ *Form 8-K*, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMISSION <http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm> [<https://perma.cc/P825-AWB3>] [hereinafter *Form 8-K*].

¹⁵² *Id.*

¹⁵³ *Id.*

¹⁵⁴ *Id.* While it does appear that some publicly traded firms attempt to mitigate the effect of filing negative news by providing the disclosure after trading hours, this behavior by firms does not appear to have a significant impact on investor behavior and would be irrelevant to the proposal outlined in this Article, because the proposed review would not be tied to the market timing of the disclosure. See generally Benjamin Segal & Dan Segal, *Are Managers Strategic in Reporting Non-Earnings News? Evidence on Timing and News Bundling*, 21 REV. ACCT. STUD. 1203, 1238 (2016) (“While managers are clearly timing the release of negative news to exploit perceived investor inattention, there is no evidence of this strategy bearing fruit.”).

¹⁵⁵ Alison Tanchyk et al., *Morgan Lewis Explains New DOJ Counsel to Focus on Corporate Compliance*, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 11, 2015), <http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/09/11/morgan-lewis-explains-new-doj-counsel-to-focus-on-corporate-compliance/> [<https://perma.cc/T94J-9D4U>]. The compliance counsel works specifically with DOJ Fraud at this time, but the DOJ could

sel's position is to distinguish between an effective compliance program and a paper program.¹⁵⁶ In November 2015, the DOJ provided more details regarding the metrics the compliance expert would utilize in determining whether and how a company should be charged criminally.¹⁵⁷ The metrics have been summarized as follows for organizations:

- Do directors and managers offer strong support for corporate compliance policies?
- Do compliance personnel have stature in the company? Do the compliance teams get the resources they need?
- Are compliance policies clear and in writing? Are they easily understood and translated[?]
- Are the compliance policies effectively communicated to employees? Are they easy to find and do employees get repeated training?
- Are the compliance policies updated?
- Are there ways to enforce the compliance policies and is compliance incentivized and violators disciplined?
- Are third parties informed of compliance expectations?¹⁵⁸

Additionally, the compliance counsel's assessment of compliance programs within financial institutions would also include the following.

- Can the financial institution identify its customers?
- Is the company complying with U.S. laws?
- Are reports of suspicious activity shared with other branches or offices?
- Do banks with a U.S. presence give U.S. senior managers a "material role" in compliance?
- Is the company candid with regulators?¹⁵⁹

Absent, almost shockingly so, is a metric looking at whether the organization has engaged in past instances of misconduct. Because the new compliance counsel is delegated its authority via the intra-agency discretion of the DOJ, the DOJ department heads have complete authority and autonomy over the metrics the compliance counsel utilizes in making her assessments regarding an organization's compliance program.¹⁶⁰ Adding an additional metric to the compliance counsel's as-

broaden the compliance counsel's scope of authority or employ another compliance counsel with oversight over multiple DOJ divisions.

¹⁵⁶ *Id.*

¹⁵⁷ Dockery, *supra* note 70.

¹⁵⁸ *Id.*

¹⁵⁹ *Id.*

¹⁶⁰ See Sue Reisinger, *Report: Justice Dept. Names Chen to Controversial Compliance Counsel Post*, CORP. COUNS. (Sept. 21, 2015), <http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202737784530/Report-Justice-Dept-Names-Chen-to-Controversial->

assessment tools would be relatively easy to implement, particularly given the compliance counsel's infancy within the DOJ.¹⁶¹ The current compliance counsel works exclusively with DOJ Fraud, but the position could serve as a model for the type of position the DOJ could create to assist it in its efforts to detect recidivist behavior both within the DOJ and with other federal regulators and agencies.

Thus, under this prong of the proposal, the government could, for example, create a system whereby three settlement disclosures via Form 8-Ks within a five-year period trigger an automatic referral from the SEC to a new DOJ compliance counsel as well as to any regulator with which the company settled allegations of institutional misconduct within the preceding five years. After a review of the past instances of misconduct, if the DOJ compliance counsel were to determine that the company was engaged in behavior that warrants recidivist treatment, the DOJ could then flag the company as requiring recidivist treatment if future misconduct by the firm is uncovered. In essence, the DOJ would have the tools necessary to create a list of firms that should be treated as recidivists. The list could be made available to all federal regulators along with a request that the DOJ be notified if a regulator is contemplating entering into an agreement to settle claims of misconduct by the relevant organization within the next few years.

In another formulation, the DOJ compliance counsel could make it a part of her routine to regularly check Form 8-Ks when assessing an organization's compliance program. If Form 8-Ks from a specified period of time, like five years, indicated multiple instances of misconduct, the compliance counsel could consider that when determining what and how the DOJ should ultimately pursue an enforcement action against the corporation.

Regardless of how the review of Form 8-Ks is operationalized by DOJ compliance counsel, the government is already in possession of all the data and resources it needs to allow it to effectively assess the types of misconduct that corporations are resolving with governmental actors. The upshot is that the government could improve its ability to detect recidivist behavior without requiring corporations to disclose additional information. Increased detection of recidivist behavior could result

Compliance-Counsel-Post?slreturn=20151010192409 [https://perma.cc/Y94D-XTLT].

¹⁶¹ The compliance counsel began work at the DOJ on November 3, 2015. See Dockery, *supra* note 70.

in a greater probability that additional sanctions might be levied against firms that engage in repeated acts of misconduct across diverse legal and regulatory areas.

2. *Proposal for Increasing Potential Fines or Other Penalties*

Traditional economic analysis suggests that a sufficient monetary fine can deter misconduct within private firms.¹⁶² The sophisticated corporation of today, however, should probably budget for an expected monetary penalty as a result of institutional misconduct. HSBC, for example, has paid literally billions of dollars in fines over the past five years. As part of the company's 2012 deferred prosecution agreement alone, HSBC agreed to pay \$1.92 billion in fines,¹⁶³ yet the company has continued to engage in various forms of misconduct and, as a result, has been subjected to additional penalties in the form of high fines.¹⁶⁴

Thus, it appears that the private firms of today are all too willing to pay monetary fines as a consequence for failing to prevent and detect misconduct. These same firms, however, have shown a strong distaste for other forms of non-monetary penalties. Governmental actors, of course, routinely use a package of monetary and non-monetary penalties in their attempts to create incentives for corporations to behave in an ethical and compliant manner.¹⁶⁵ But this Article proposes that governmental actors should consider finding additional, non-monetary penalties that are generally considered to be undesirable to private firms and levy those "heightened" penalties against recidivist firms in addition to more standard monetary

¹⁶² See Miller, *Compliance Function*, *supra* note 32, at 16 ("The most effective sanction against an offending organization is a fine; but fines can be obtained in civil enforcement actions without the high burden of proof and constitutional protections required in criminal cases."). But see Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC "Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly," *but What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC's New Enforcement Approach*, 124 YALE L.J. 209, 222–24 (2014) (explaining the mixed evidence for fines as an effective enforcement tool for corporations).

¹⁶³ Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, *HSBC to Pay \$1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in Money-Laundering Case*, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2012, 6:15 PM), <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/11/us-hsbc-probe-idUSBRE8BA05M20121211> [<https://perma.cc/4A9C-BAD8>].

¹⁶⁴ See *supra* Introduction.

¹⁶⁵ See, e.g., Cunningham, *supra* note 32, at 71 (2014) (criticizing the ability of prosecutors to engage in effective corporate governance reform efforts); see also Brandon L. Garrett, *Rehabilitating Corporations*, 66 FLA. L. REV. FORUM 1, 3 (2014) (suggesting judges take a more active role in overseeing the agreed-upon penalties).

finances and non-monetary penalties. There are likely a variety of particularly distasteful non-monetary penalties—penalties that corporations would go to extraordinary lengths to avoid—that the government could promote as part of its enforcement strategies.

This Article proposes that the government focus on three such penalties, which are graduated in nature. Adopting these three penalties would permit the government to adopt an enforcement strategy that increases its criminal enforcement actions against recidivist corporations while substantially decreasing potential civil resolutions of corporate misconduct for recidivists. In particular, public companies that have engaged in wrongdoing are reluctant to (i) receive a concrete finding of guilt¹⁶⁶ that declares that the firm participated in conduct that violates legal and regulatory requirements; (ii) allow broad, direct access of its internal workings to governmental actors out of fear that this information could flow to third-parties and be used against the firm in subsequent civil litigation;¹⁶⁷ and (iii) cede authority to a court-appointed master, trustee, or monitor.¹⁶⁸ These sorts of penalties are considered to be especially unpalatable to private firms, which makes them particularly well-suited for creating incentives for corporations to make comprehensive compliance reform a priority before they engage in recidivist conduct and can become subject to these sorts of heightened penalties.

a. *Pursue Official Findings of Guilt*

Governmental actors' reliance upon civil enforcement actions is rational given the reluctance on the part of corporations to enter into guilty pleas acknowledging criminal behavior.

Organizational defendants don't want to admit to criminal behavior, both because doing so will damage their reputations and also because the plea may be used against them in subsequent civil litigation. In many cases, therefore, the

¹⁶⁶ Miller, *Compliance Function*, *supra* note 32, at 16–17.

¹⁶⁷ See, e.g., Root, *Monitor-“Client,”* *supra* note 56, at 545–48 (discussing AIG's reluctance to enter into a settlement agreement without an order of binding confidentiality from the court that would prevent the monitor from turning over its findings to parties other than the government).

¹⁶⁸ See Root, *Modern-Day Monitorships*, *supra* note 134, at 116–22 (discussing the use of traditional, court-appointed monitorships and modern-day, court-ordered monitorships and the customary unwillingness of companies to enter into those types of monitorships).

need to admit guilt in a plea bargain will be a stumbling block to settlement.

To avoid this problem, the government has devised alternative remedies: deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs).¹⁶⁹

However, the government's reliance on civil enforcement actions puts limits on the government's ability to utilize the Organizational Guidelines, which contemplate a regime of increased sanctions for recidivist firms by providing heightened penalties for firms that engage in "similar misconduct."¹⁷⁰ If governmental actors pursue a strategy aimed at obtaining findings of guilt from recidivist organizations, whether by plea or fact-finder determination, it would function as a heightened penalty as compared to the status quo and, if a finding of guilt were obtained, it would make additional, non-monetary penalties available for the government to seek against the recidivist corporation. Pursuing official findings of guilt against corporations might initially appear much more costly than entering into negotiated settlement agreements, but many firms will plead guilty without risking the costs of going to trial where, if found guilty, they could be subject to greater monetary fines and other penalties than if they were to enter into a plea agreement.¹⁷¹ Thus, the additional costs of pursuing official findings of guilt may not, in practice, be significant.

b. *Allowing the Government Broad Access to the Firm's Internal Workings*

The Organizational Guidelines, which are the proper source of authority for determining an organization's sanction after a finding of guilt or guilty plea, provide a framework for levying higher penalties on firms that engage in recidivist behavior. Indeed, in its Introductory Commentary, the Organizational Guidelines outline four factors that will "increase the ultimate punishment of an organization," and one of those factors is "the prior history of the organization."¹⁷² The guidelines

¹⁶⁹ Miller, *Compliance Function*, *supra* note 32, at 16–17.

¹⁷⁰ U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(F) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).

¹⁷¹ See Brandon L. Garrett, *Globalized Corporate Prosecutions*, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1786, 1789 (2011) (explaining that even when prosecutors "seek an indictment and conviction," which can have "possibly dire consequences for the corporations," they "typically result[] in a plea bargain and not a trial," and noting that if, for example, Siemens had been convicted at trial, the possible fines it would have been required to pay would have been much greater than what it paid under a plea agreement).

¹⁷² U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt.

explain that “[r]ecurrence of similar misconduct creates doubt regarding whether the organization took reasonable steps” to meet the guidelines’ admonishment to adopt an effective compliance and ethics program.¹⁷³ Thus, the guidelines set out a variety of consequences for organizations that are found guilty or who have pleaded guilty to engaging in misconduct and for firms that engage in recidivist behavior.

One such consequence is a term of corporate probation.¹⁷⁴ The government cannot guarantee that a court will order a term of corporate probation, but it can adopt a strategy of aggressively recommending that the court order a period of corporate probation for firms that engage in recidivist conduct. The guidelines outline several conditions that “may be appropriate” to order as part of an organization’s corporate probation.¹⁷⁵ One available condition states that:

The organization shall submit to: (A) a reasonable number of regular or unannounced examinations of its books and records at appropriate business premises by the probation officer or experts engaged by the court; and (B) interrogation of knowledgeable individuals within the organization. Compensation to and costs of any experts engaged by the court shall be paid by the organization.¹⁷⁶

Corporations who are engaged in misconduct often spend a great deal of time and money avoiding penalties of this nature, in part, because once information is provided to the government, it can be subject to certain reporting obligations under the Freedom of Information Act.¹⁷⁷ Additionally, information that becomes part of a “judicial record” is typically information that courts must make publicly available, and if a court uses the information gathered by the probation office or expert, it could transform the businesses information into a publicly available, judicial record.¹⁷⁸

Thus, if governmental actors adopt an enforcement strategy that attempts to achieve, as a condition of probation, broad access to the internal workings of recidivist firms, it would likely serve to heighten the penalties associated with engaging in recidivist behavior. This, in turn, would create an incentive

¹⁷³ U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt 2(D).

¹⁷⁴ See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.1 (describing scenarios where the court is required to order probation).

¹⁷⁵ U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4(b).

¹⁷⁶ U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.4(b)(5).

¹⁷⁷ See Root, *Monitor-“Client,”* *supra* note 56, at 547.

¹⁷⁸ For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Root, *Monitor-“Client,”* *supra* note 56, at 540–49.

for private firms to ensure their compliance programs are effective on a comprehensive, as opposed to a piecemeal, basis when incidents of misconduct occur and trigger a compliance review.

c. *Court-Appointed Master, Trustee, or Monitor*

The Organizational Guidelines also outline a set of heightened penalties for firms that (i) were found to be guilty of engaging in misconduct, (ii) were ordered to undergo a term of corporate probation, and (iii) violated a condition of probation.¹⁷⁹ “Upon a finding of a violation of a condition of probation, the court may extend the term of probation, impose more restrictive conditions of probation, or revoke probation and re-sentence the organization.”¹⁸⁰ The Commentary to § 8F1.1 goes on to explain that “[i]n the event of repeated violations of conditions of probation, the appointment of a master or trustee may be appropriate to ensure compliance with court orders.”¹⁸¹

Corporations do not like retaining monitors in a civil context where, arguably, the corporation has some power to negotiate the scope of the monitorship and the breadth of the monitor’s duties.¹⁸² Thus, it is unsurprising that corporations (i) appear to hold a great deal of disdain for the imposition of *court-ordered* masters, trustees, or monitors and (ii) have engaged in protracted battles to invalidate court mandates imposing these sort of third parties.¹⁸³

Again, governmental actors cannot guarantee that the court will appoint a master, trustee, or monitor, but they can choose to adopt an enforcement strategy that aggressively lobbies the court to formally impose a master, trustee, or monitor when a private firm is involved in repeated instances of wrongdoing. The adoption of such a strategy would likely serve to increase the non-monetary penalties that firms would be subject to in the case of recidivism, and it would provide a strong incentive for corporations to ensure that their compliance programs are designed to ensure comprehensive, as opposed to piecemeal, compliance with legal and regulatory requirements.

¹⁷⁹ U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8F1.1.

¹⁸⁰ *Id.*

¹⁸¹ *Id.* cmt.

¹⁸² See generally Root, *Monitor-“Client,”* *supra* note 56, at 540–49 (discussing negotiated monitorships); Root, *Modern-Day Monitorships*, *supra* note 134, at 133–37 (describing Apple’s court battle to limit the scope of its monitorship); Warin et al., *supra* note 56, at 365–68 (describing how a corporation may negotiate the scope of a monitorship).

¹⁸³ See Root, *Modern-Day Monitorships*, *supra* note 134, at 130–37 (discussing court-ordered monitorships).

* * *

The proposals outlined would enable the government to adopt an enforcement strategy that increases the potential sanction for corporate repeat offenders by utilizing existing governmental resources and policies. Increased coordination amongst various governmental actors paired with a shift in the sanctions pursued against corporate repeat offenders would create a strong incentive for firms to assess the effectiveness of their compliance programs as a whole when misconduct occurs as opposed to focusing narrowly on a particular compliance area.

IV

BENEFITS, OBJECTIONS, & UNRESOLVED CONCERNS

This Article's proposed framework has several potential benefits if embraced by governmental actors, and this Part begins with a description of a few such benefits. The Part goes on to discuss objections to the proposal presented. The Part concludes by addressing some unresolved concerns raised by the Article.

A. Potential Benefits

This Part will address five ways in which this Article's proposal might assist in efforts to improve compliance programs within private firms. First, it will improve the ability of the government to identify and sanction corporate repeat offenders. Second, the detection mechanism outlined allows for an unbiased standard for reviewing an organization's past misconduct. Third, the Article's proposal is based on a "standard" instead of an easy to manipulate "bright-line rule." Fourth, it will encourage organizations to put a greater emphasis on architecture, as opposed to policing, strategies when focusing on their compliance programs. Fifth, the proposal may encourage private firms to put a greater emphasis on promoting ethicality in their workforce.

1. *Improved Ability to Treat Recidivists as Such*

Subpart III.A explained how information, coordination, and reputation challenges or deficiencies contribute to the government's failure to properly detect and aggressively sanction corporate repeat offenders. This Article's proposal directly addresses these problems.

To the extent that a lack of information contributed to the government's failure to properly detect corporate repeat offenders, the proposal's reliance on Form 8-Ks allows reliable, non-biased information to serve as the basis for a review of the relevant corporate entity for recidivist conduct.¹⁸⁴ Form 8-K review will allow for both interagency coordination of the information, because any enforcement action brought by agencies outside of the DOJ would be captured in Form 8-K reporting, and intra-agency coordination, because enforcement actions brought by separate divisions of the DOJ would also be captured. Form 8-Ks provide a concrete and reliable mechanism for identifying prior civil and criminal enforcement actions brought against the corporate wrongdoer.

One might, however, question whether there is actually an information problem amongst governmental agencies and actors because enforcement actions are often easy to discover when one runs an internet search or follows certain enforcement and compliance news sources.¹⁸⁵ One might argue that governmental enforcement agents should begin enforcement actions by running a corporate background check, so to speak, to determine whether other corporate misconduct has recently occurred. If previous offenses are identified, the government enforcement agent could choose to require a more draconian sanction than what it would normally pursue. This is important because if government enforcement agents are aware of past misconduct and actively choose not to pursue heightened sanctions, it might not indicate an information problem but instead reflect the government's unwillingness to sanction corporate repeat offenders.¹⁸⁶ The lack of heightened sanctions for recidivists may merely be a reflection of a lack of political will and not indicative of any sort of information problem or deficiency.

The information problem raised by this Article, however, does not take place in a vacuum, and the Article is not claiming that government enforcement agents are technically unaware of the enforcement actions brought by their counterparts at other agencies. Instead, the Article is arguing that the information problem is inextricably tied to the coordination and re-

¹⁸⁴ See Form 8-K, *supra* note 151 (describing all corporate activities that require investor notification).

¹⁸⁵ See, e.g., COMPLIANCE WEEK, <https://www.complianceweek.com> [<https://perma.cc/L6V6-2U4M>] (reporting and analyzing enforcement actions).

¹⁸⁶ But see Katrice Bridges Copeland, *Enforcing Integrity*, 87 IND. L.J. 1033, 1035 (2012) (explaining that a government policy avoiding punitive measures against companies may be meant to avoid harming innocent third-parties).

sponsibility challenges associated with inter- and intra-agency coordination and related to the incentivizing of corporations to adopt ethics and compliance programs that will prevent corporate recidivism.

DOJ Fraud may be aware that it is entering into a settlement agreement with a company that entered into an agreement with the FCC the previous year, but DOJ Fraud has no current incentive to expend additional resources for pursuing recidivist conduct that is unrelated to the types of misconduct DOJ Fraud is charged with prosecuting. DOJ Fraud has a limited budget and limited resources in the form of attorneys and other employees, so it is likely rational for DOJ Fraud to be concerned solely with the types of corporate misconduct within its zone of responsibility.

Thus, this Article's proposal seeks to coordinate formal review of enforcement actions brought by diverse governmental agents via Form 8-K review and to designate responsibility for this review to a particular person (or persons) responsible for considering whether a corporation has an effective ethics and compliance program. By tasking a specific individual with reviewing the Form 8-Ks, someone within the DOJ will have specific authority for making recommendations regarding the appropriate enforcement strategy against a particular corporation. This individual could be given direct responsibility and, if deemed appropriate by DOJ agency heads, could alert other interested governmental actors and agencies to the compliance counsel's findings. Thus, the individual line attorney at DOJ Fraud would no longer be responsible for considering whether a heightened sanction should be pursued in a particular manner due to the corporate defendants past, unrelated misconduct. Instead, the individual line attorney would get a formal recommendation by the new DOJ compliance counsel to pursue a more aggressive sanction. This formal recommendation would help motivate the individual line attorney to pursue more aggressive sanctions against corporate repeat offenders as part of larger enforcement efforts that are more expansive than the goals of the attorney's particular agency or department.

Thus, this Article's proposal promotes a more coordinated enforcement effort amongst various governmental enforcement actors. This coordinated effort will allow for more complete consideration of whether a corporation's compliance program is deficient in some manner.

2. *Unbiased Standard for Detection and Evaluation*

Another benefit of the Article's proposal is that it utilizes an unbiased standard for detecting and evaluating repeated instances of misconduct at private firms. Utilizing the Form 8-K for detecting repeat offenders ensures that the detection mechanism is not easy to manipulate based on the notoriety of the company or past instances of misconduct. This Article's detection mechanism allows an unbiased trigger to prompt the compliance counsel's review of past misconduct by public companies. Without an unbiased mechanism, one might be concerned that a recidivism review would occur most often when there was widespread knowledge of an organization's misconduct, but that would allow smaller companies or companies whose misconduct is of the sort that is unlikely to garner much media attention to escape heightened sanctions for recidivist conduct.

3. *Proposes a "Standard" Verses a "Rule"*

Additionally, the compliance counsel's review is part of a "standard," not a "rule." Once a corporate entity is referred to the compliance counsel for consideration regarding the effectiveness of the firm's compliance program, the proposal allows for an independent review of the corporate entity's policies and procedures when making a determination as to whether the firm should be subject to more aggressive enforcement actions and sanctions. Thus, this Article's proposal is more of a standard than a rule, because it does not require recidivist treatment when a corporation has engaged in a particular number of offenses. Instead, the proposal leaves discretion with the compliance counsel and the relevant enforcement officials about the best way to proceed in addressing issues of compliance at a particular corporate entity, given the particular facts and circumstances presented.

In this context, a rule might be easy for a corporate entity to game for its advantage.¹⁸⁷ For example, if a rule was adopted that five settlement agreements within a five-year period automatically required a more aggressive prosecutorial

¹⁸⁷ See, e.g., Allan Sloan, *Treasury's Game of Whac-A-Mole: Keeping Corporate Taxes in the USA*, WASH. POST (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/treasury-will-need-to-bring-its-a-game-of-whac-a-mole/2016/04/01/94431f06-f675-11e5-a3ce-f06b5ba21f33_story.html [https://perma.cc/SQA5-FEXZ] (describing the Treasury Department's struggle to enforce penalties against companies that evade US tax authorities through corporate inversions).

posture by the DOJ, a company might not be motivated to overhaul its compliance program until it entered the fourth settlement. Alternatively, the company may attempt to stall entering into a fifth settlement agreement until a time period where earlier settlement agreements fell outside the relevant five-year period. Rules are easy to predict and, therefore, easy to game.

However, the standard outlined in this Article's proposal is less vulnerable to corporate gamesmanship because elements of prosecutorial discretion remain intact. The proposal addresses the coordination problems inherent in the U.S. enforcement structure and apparatus, but does not sacrifice the individualized review necessary to ensure that more aggressive prosecutions are brought only when warranted by the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the effectiveness of the ethics and compliance program at the firm being evaluated.

4. *Greater Emphasis on Corporate Architecture Strategies*

This Article's proposal, by improving coordination amongst governmental enforcement agents and encouraging more aggressive prosecutions and sanctions for corporate repeat offenders, is aimed at incentivizing corporations to improve their compliance programs. There are, however, different types of compliance activity within firms.

Much of the work engaged in by compliance professionals falls into two broad categories: "the corporate policing approach that is familiar to many[] and a structural approach one might call 'corporate architecture.'"¹⁸⁸ "The policing approach reduces corporate crime by empowering internal policemen to identify, punish, and deter actual and would-be transgressors."¹⁸⁹ In contrast, the "architectural approach encourages corporate personnel to seek out and mitigate problematic *situations* as opposed to problematic people. It seeks proactively to improve decision-making systems, thereby reducing the opportunity and temptation for fraud. It is at once less judgmental and yet potentially more intrusive."¹⁹⁰

The corporate policing approach is easier for firms to implement, but the corporate architecture approach is equally important.¹⁹¹ If governmental actors were to engage in efforts to treat repeat offender firms as recidivists, it might encourage

¹⁸⁸ Baer, *supra* note at 31, at 93.

¹⁸⁹ *Id.*

¹⁹⁰ *Id.* at 94.

¹⁹¹ *See id.* at 148.

corporations to increase the amount of time they spend engaging in corporate architecture strategies. Instead of focusing almost solely on detecting and punishing misconduct, firms would need to think more proactively about areas where they are vulnerable to compliance failures. In turn, firms would need to identify and implement proactive strategies aimed at mitigating compliance failures that might occur in the future based on their risk assessment.

An emphasis on increased policing, as opposed to better corporate architecture strategies, is evident in numerous responses to corporate misconduct. For example, JPMorgan recently adopted an aggressive policing strategy in response to “government probes into fraudulent mortgage-bond sales, the \$6.2 billion London Whale trading loss, services provided to Ponzi-scheme operator Bernard Madoff and the rigging of currency and energy markets.”¹⁹² In the past three years, the company “has hired 2,500 [new] compliance workers and spent \$730 million” to improve its compliance operations.¹⁹³ Additionally, the company is utilizing an algorithm with dozens of inputs in an attempt to “identify rogue employees before they go astray.”¹⁹⁴ JPMorgan’s clear response to corporate misconduct is to strengthen its internal policing strategies, but policing strategies are only one piece of an effective ethics and compliance program.

JPMorgan’s emphasis on policing strategies is important because excessive monitoring and policing of employees “may unintentionally erode compliance norms” within firms.¹⁹⁵ “For example, heavy-handed [policing] methods may trigger feelings of distrust among employees, thereby reducing internal motivations to comply with the law.”¹⁹⁶ Corporate architecture strategies, however, require firms to collaborate with their employees to avoid engaging in misconduct, thereby empowering employees to assist the firm in its compliance efforts.¹⁹⁷ The government’s current enforcement regime promotes, and at times rewards, aggressive policing, but that appears to come at

¹⁹² Hugh Son, *JPMorgan Algorithm Knows You’re a Rogue Employee Before You Do*, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:00 AM), <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-08/jpmorgan-algorithm-knows-you-re-a-rogue-employee-before-you-do> [https://perma.cc/C63E-KL5P].

¹⁹³ *Id.*

¹⁹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁹⁵ Baer, *supra* note 31, at 136.

¹⁹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁹⁷ *See id.* at 134–35.

the expense of more difficult to craft corporate architecture strategies.

5. *Emphasizing Ethicality*

Today's discussions of compliance often take place without any corresponding emphasis on the importance of promoting ethicality.¹⁹⁸ Many perceive issues surrounding ethicality to be separate from issues of compliance, yet research from the fields of behavioral ethics and behavioral legal ethics suggests that separating ethics from compliance strategies may in fact be harmful to the firm.¹⁹⁹

In part, this is because "aggressive compliance monitoring can have an unfavorable effect on the motivation of agents to comply with rules."²⁰⁰ Behavioral ethics literature demonstrates that when individuals are told to comply with rules for the sake of compliance instead of for the sake of acting ethically, it can actually diminish ethical behavior within firms.²⁰¹ Behavioral ethics research also demonstrates that mandating specific goals can create systematic problems. Specifically, they can encourage employees to "1. focus too narrowly on their goals, to the neglect of nongoal areas; 2. engage in risky behavior; 3. focus on extrinsic motivators and lose their intrinsic motivation; 4. and, most importantly . . . , engage in more unethical behavior than they would otherwise."²⁰²

By encouraging a more comprehensive overhaul of firms' compliance programs, governmental actors may prompt compliance gatekeepers within firms to consider questions of ethics in addition to questions associated with ensuring effective policing methods within the organization. The Organizational Guidelines already state that firms should engage in employing an effective compliance and ethics program, so a return to considerations of ethicality when considering issues of compliance within firms does not appear to be a dramatic or unprecedented action.²⁰³ Indeed, it could be a valuable use of time and energy for an organization attempting to create an organiza-

¹⁹⁸ See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Essay, *Risky Business*, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957, 1973 (2006).

¹⁹⁹ Indeed, in Professor Miller's recent overview of the compliance function, he asserts that "the law of compliance shares an uneasy boundary with a broader set of issues that might loosely be termed 'ethics beyond compliance.'" Miller, *Compliance Function*, *supra* note 32, at 18.

²⁰⁰ Regan, *supra* note 198, at 1970.

²⁰¹ See MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS 103-07 (2011).

²⁰² *Id.* at 104.

²⁰³ See Miller, *Compliance Function*, *supra* note 32, at 12.

tional culture that discourages misconduct and encourages ethical conduct.

B. Objections

Despite the many benefits to this Article's proposed framework, there are some potential objections. This section will outline three. First, whether interagency coordination may actually produce harmful results for efforts to quell recidivist corporate misconduct. Second, whether it is appropriate to sanction organizations with complex structures in a uniform manner. Third, whether the proposal's focus on public companies is too narrow in scope.

1. *Might Interagency Coordination Actually Produce Harmful Results?*

This Article proposes improving the sharing of information and cooperation of diverse regulatory agencies in an effort to encourage sanctions for recidivist corporate misconduct. There are, however, a variety of potential downsides to increased coordination amongst agencies.

First, increased coordination "can make less resilient the legal safeguards pursuant to which individual agencies carry out their missions."²⁰⁴ For example, if an agency that typically pursues only civil penalties begins to coordinate with the DOJ, it may be that an offense that Congress meant to be remedied in a civil context may result in a company receiving a heightened sanction due to a determination that the company is a recidivist when a subsequent, similar offense is discovered. Second, if agencies with shared but distinct enforcement space begin to coordinate in actions brought against corporations, it may present a unique challenge if judicial review of the coordinated-agency action must be obtained. Courts typically review administrative action "of a single agency operating in relative insularity from other administrative actors, exercising formal legal authority through discrete actions that resemble lawmaking or adjudication."²⁰⁵ If courts must instead review coordinated-agency action, it may be difficult to parse which actions are acceptable for which governmental actors. Third, if governmental actors decide to coordinate on their own accord, "the resulting arrangements are not only of far lower visibility than legislative enactments, but they are also prone to self-dealing

²⁰⁴ Daphna Renan, *Pooling Powers*, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 252–60 (2015).

²⁰⁵ *Id.* at 268.

by the enforcers” engaged in the coordination effort.²⁰⁶ Fourth, an increased level of coordination between administrative agencies and the DOJ may allow an agency to refer a case to the DOJ that the agency does not want to expend resources pursuing, thereby allowing it to blame the DOJ if it determines not to go forward with the case.²⁰⁷ Fifth, the role of prosecutors, like those found at the DOJ, is typically understood to “require a certain level of independence to make their decisions without inappropriate and extraneous political pressures.”²⁰⁸ If the DOJ is required to engage in a coordinated effort with external agencies, it might infringe on the DOJ’s independent assessments and decision making.

The above are just a few of what are many potential concerns when one considers the drawbacks associated with interagency coordination and the sharing of information and responsibility across distinct regulatory actors. These concerns should not be ignored, but they should also be assessed in a slightly different way when one considers their application to an interagency coordination strategy aimed at addressing recidivist conduct.

The firms subject to this Article’s proposal will necessarily have had multiple encounters with government actors as a result of corporate misconduct. These encounters would have been initiated and assessed on an individual basis long before the type of coordination proposed by this Article would even begin to be contemplated. As a result, the legitimacy of the initial enforcement actions would not be subject to the complexities created by interagency coordination. Additionally, the coordination suggested in this Article consists of an independent assessment by a DOJ official, thereby allowing the DOJ to maintain independence in its exercise of prosecutorial discretion. That is not to suggest that challenges or downsides associated with interagency coordination would not exist in an effort aimed at sanctioning repeat corporate offenders in an effort to increase incentives for firms to improve their compliance programs. It does, however, suggest that the traditional

²⁰⁶ Daniel C. Richman, *The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law Enforcement*, in 2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2000, at 81, 102 (Charles M. Friel ed., 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_2/02d2.pdf [<https://perma.cc/M74F-4PK9>] (discussing coordination amongst state and federal enforcement authorities).

²⁰⁷ See Daniel Richman, *Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors*, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 763–65 (2003).

²⁰⁸ Angela J. Davis, *The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny*, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 438 (2001).

concerns regarding interagency coordination may not be as significant in a regime aimed at coordinating sanctions for recidivist conduct by corporate offenders.

2. *Is it Appropriate to Sanction Organizations with Complex Structures in a Uniform Manner?*

Today's corporate organizations are complex. Some firms have a variety of related entities or subsidiaries. For example, HSBC, like many public companies, has several subsidiaries.²⁰⁹ The instances of misconduct outlined in the Introduction were committed by a variety of HSBC subsidiaries.²¹⁰ Other organizations are extremely large organizations with relatively siloed departments that function autonomously as mini-companies.²¹¹ Thus, a legitimate question exists as to whether organizations with complex structures should be treated as one entity for purposes of a recidivism review.²¹²

Importantly, this Article's proposal is consistent with the manner in which corporations and the DOJ currently negotiate settlement agreements. The DOJ treats related corporate entities as if they are one unit, so it would seem appropriate to develop a strategy that does the same.²¹³ For example, when three Hewlett-Packard subsidiaries settled FCPA violations, the parent company, while not entering into an agreement with DOJ Fraud, "committed to maintain and continue enhancing its compliance program and internal accounting controls."²¹⁴ In another example, Alcatel-Lucent agreed to make changes to its compliance program across all of its related entities. Specifically, the agreement states:

Alcatel-Lucent represents that it has implemented and will continue to implement a compliance and ethics program designed to prevent and detect violations of the FCPA, the anti-corruption provisions of French law, and other applicable

²⁰⁹ See Miller, *Compliance Function*, *supra* note 32, at 18 (describing how organizations can benefit from a favorable public image or psychological benefits for members of the organization).

²¹⁰ See *Simplified Structure Chart*, HSBC (Dec. 31, 2016), <http://www.hsbc.com/~media/hsbc-com/about-hsbc/structure-and-network/pdfs/group-structure-chart.pdf> [https://perma.cc/5K83-9PXH].

²¹¹ Coca-Cola stands as a classic example of a multinational enterprise that silos its various businesses extensively. See *Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co.*, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1354–55 (S.D. Fla. 2003).

²¹² A robust analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article and will be the focus of a future project.

²¹³ See, e.g., *Deferred Prosecution Agreement*, *United States v. Hewlett-Packard Polska*, *supra* note 96.

²¹⁴ *Id.* ¶ 4.

anti-corruption laws throughout its operations, *including those of its affiliates, agents, and joint ventures, and those of its contractors and subcontractors*, with responsibilities that include interacting with foreign officials or other high risk activities.²¹⁵

In yet another example, when Vetco International and four of its subsidiaries pleaded guilty to FCPA violations, the parent company agreed to assume all of the obligations “on behalf of each of its Vetco Gray subsidiaries.”²¹⁶ Thus, the DOJ and corporations appear not to adhere to technical concerns regarding the separate legal status of related corporate entities when entering into settlement agreements. As such, it appears appropriate to consider repeat misconduct across subsidiaries when considering whether a corporate entity may be a recidivist.

Additionally, this Article’s proposal does not outline a broad-based rule; it outlines a standard by which DOJ compliance counsel can make an individualized assessment regarding an organization’s compliance program. Nothing in the proposal prevents DOJ compliance counsel, or individual prosecutors charged with bringing an enforcement action against a company, from determining whether it appears appropriate to treat separate instances of misconduct independently. The proposal outlined leaves a great deal of discretion with prosecutors to make the charging decisions they deem appropriate given the totality of the circumstances before them.

Thus, while concerns regarding the appropriate treatment of corporations with complex organizational structures are legitimate in this context and would benefit from further research, those considerations are not dispositive to the claims outlined in this Article.

3. *Is a Proposal Aimed at Public Companies Too Narrow?*

This Article focuses on misconduct at public companies, and the proposal outlined in Part III is crafted in a manner meant to incentivize public companies to overhaul their compliance programs. Yet organizational misconduct is not limited to public companies. Thus, a legitimate criticism might be raised regarding the wisdom of putting forth a proposal that is inherently limited in its ability to deter repeat corporate mis-

²¹⁵ Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 8, *United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.*, No. 10-20907 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2010), ECF No. 10 (emphasis added).

²¹⁶ Plea Agreement ¶ 10, *United States v. Vetco Gray UK Ltd.*, No. CR-H-07-004 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2007), ECF No. 26.

conduct because only public companies are required to file Form 8-Ks, thus only public companies would receive a recidivism review.

Yet the reality is that incentivizing more ethical institutions, which will pursue strategies that may result in effective compliance programs, requires a multifaceted approach. This Article's proposals will not and cannot create a perfect set of incentives to ensure that all organizations establish effective ethics and compliance programs. However, this Article's proposal, if adopted, will address some of the coordination challenges that are an inherent part of the current U.S. regulatory structure and will provide an additional incentive for firms to implement policies that will address compliance deficiencies on a wholesale, as opposed to a piecemeal, basis.

C. Unresolved Concerns

There are a variety of open questions raised by this Article's suggestions and proposal. This Part will discuss two such questions. First, what factors should the DOJ compliance counsel consider when determining whether an organization should be treated as a corporate repeat offender? Second, what types of misconduct should be considered in a repeat offender assessment?

1. *When Should an Organization Be Treated as a Repeat Offender?*

One question raised by the case study in subpart III.C is when an organization should be treated as a repeat offender. The case study identified three categories of repeated misconduct. Category 1 includes multiple offenses with the same or similar unlawful objectives and behavior. Category 2 includes multiple offenses with the same or similar unlawful behavior but dissimilar unlawful objectives. Category 3 includes multiple offenses that do not share any characteristics in terms of the type of unlawful behavior or unlawful purpose.

This issue might benefit from further research, particularly as it relates to Category 2, but it seems most important that companies falling into Category 1 be treated as repeat offenders. The companies outlined in Category 1 appear to have institutional deficiencies in creating a culture that disavows bribery as a mechanism for obtaining a competitive business advantage. When organizational misconduct contains these types of similarities, it may be appropriate to treat the organization as a repeat offender. In contrast, the companies out-

lined in Category 3 do not appear to have entered into misconduct that looks in any way related. Thus, the misconduct identified looks less likely to reflect some sort of underlying deficiency with the firm's compliance program.

Importantly, this Article is not advocating for a bright-line rule establishing what does and does not count as recidivist behavior for corporate offenders. Instead, the Article purposefully leaves a determination of what should count as recidivist conduct firmly within the discretion of the governmental actor considering whether the types of corporate misconduct that have occurred are sufficiently similar to warrant a label of recidivist and a correspondingly heightened sanction.

2. *What Legal Areas Should Be Part of a Repeat Offender Assessment?*

There are a multitude of ways that a corporation can violate legal or regulatory requirements. Another legitimate question is what types of violations should "count" when determining whether to treat a corporation as a repeat offender.

Again, this issue would likely benefit from additional research, but it appears as if organizational misconduct can be divided into two basic groups. The first includes misconduct that is traditionally enforced through public means, so through formal, governmental action (e.g., governmental prosecutions). The second includes misconduct that is traditionally enforced through private means (e.g., employment discrimination lawsuits).

Because this Article is focused on how public enforcement agents can more effectively incentivize firms to implement effective ethics and compliance programs, it seems most appropriate for the former category to be considered when determining whether to treat a corporation as a repeat offender. There are likely other proposals for reform that would be better suited to address repeated instances of misconduct for firms that have engaged in the latter types of wrongdoing.

CONCLUSION

The government has dedicated a great deal of time, effort, money, and energy to incentivizing private firms to implement effective ethics and compliance programs. This Article makes three contributions to the academic discourse on organizational compliance efforts. First, the Article, through a case study, demonstrates that governmental enforcement agents

are largely ignoring corporate recidivism. Second, the Article explains that the lack of focus by governmental agents on corporate recidivism appears to be based, at least in part, on inter- and intra-agency coordination challenges. Third, the Article argues that efforts to provide incentives aimed at improving corporate compliance would benefit from mechanisms that (i) recognize when an institution is engaged in recidivist behavior across diverse regulatory areas and (ii) more aggressively sanction institutions that are repeat offenders. By employing a more coordinated enforcement strategy that identifies an institution that is suffering from a systemic compliance failure and holds corporations responsible for being repeat offenders across diverse regulatory areas, federal regulators can encourage private firms to implement comprehensive reforms to their compliance policies and procedures. This could ultimately lead to improved ethical conduct and more effective ethics and compliance programs within public companies.

APPENDIX A

DOJ FRAUD FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BROUGHT AGAINST CORPORATIONS FROM 2004 – 2016²¹⁷

Each Enforcement Action Brought – 159 total
Actions Brought Against Related Corporate Entities – 94 total

Each. Enf. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	1	2004	InVision Technologies, Inc.	General Electric	NPA
1	0	2004	General Electric	NA	NPA
1	1	2004	ABB Vetco Gray, Inc.	ABB Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	0	2004	ABB Vetco Gray (UK) Ltd. (later named Vetco Gray UK Ltd.)	ABB Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	1	2005	DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd.	Diagnostic Products Corporation (DPC)	Guilty Plea
1	1	2005	Micrus Corporation	NA	NPA
1	1	2005	Titan Corporation	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	2005	Monsanto Company	NA	DPA
1	1	2006	Statoil	NA	DPA
1	1	2006	SSI International Far East, Ltd.	Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	0	2006	Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc.	NA	DPA
1	1	2007	Lucent Technologies Inc.	Alcatel-Lucent	NPA
1	0	2007	Akzo Nobel N.V.	NA	NPA

²¹⁷ The press releases for each enforcement action may be found on the DOJ Fraud website. See *FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions*, U.S. DEPT JUST., <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/related-enforcement-actions> [<https://perma.cc/93DF-T49H>] (providing links to each press release alphabetized by company).

Each. Enf. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	1	2007	Ingersoll-Rand Company Limited	NA	DPA
1	0	2007	Ingersoll-Rand Italiana SpA	Ingersoll-Rand Company Limited	DPA
1	0	2007	Thermo King Ireland Limited	Ingersoll-Rand Company Limited	DPA
1	1	2007	York International Corporation	NA	DPA
1	0	2007	Paradigm B.V.	NA	NPA
1	1	2007	Textron Inc.	NA	NPA
1	0	2007	David Brown Transmissions France S.A.	Textron Inc.	NPA
1	0	2007	David Brown France Engrenage S.A.S.	Textron Inc.	NPA
1	0	2007	David Brown Guinard Pumps S.A.S.	Textron Inc.	NPA
1	1	2007	Omega Advisors, Inc.	NA	NPA
1	1	2007	Baker Hughes Services International, Inc.	Baker Hughes Incorporated	Guilty Plea
1	0	2007	Baker Hughes Incorporated	NA	DPA
1	1	2007	Vetco Gray Controls Inc.	Vetco International Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	0	2007	Vetco International Limited	NA	Guilty Plea
1	0	2007	Vetco Gray Controls Limited	Vetco International Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	0	2007	Vetco Gray UK Limited	Vetco International Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	0	2007	Aibel Group Limited	Vetco International Ltd.	DPA
1	1	2008	AGA Medical Corporation	NA	DPA
1	1	2008	Volvo Construction Equipment, AB (VCE)	Aktiebolaget Volvo (AB Volvo)	DPA
1	0	2008	Renault Trucks SAS	Aktiebolaget Volvo (AB Volvo)	DPA
1	0	2008	Aktiebolaget Volvo (AB Volvo)	NA	DPA
1	1	2008	Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation	NA	NPA
1	1	2008	Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (Siemens AG)	NA	Guilty Plea
1	0	2008	Siemens S.A. (Argentina)	Siemens AG	Guilty Plea

Each. Enf. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	0	2008	Siemens Bangladesh Limited	Siemens AG	Guilty Plea
1	0	2008	Siemens S.A. (Venezuela)	Siemens AG	Guilty Plea
1	1	2008	Willbros Group Inc.	NA	DPA
1	1	2008	Willbros International	Willbros Group, Inc.	DPA
1	0	2008	Faro Technologies, Inc.	NA	NPA
1	1	2008	Fiat S.p.A.	NA	DPA
1	0	2008	CNH France S.A.	Fiat S.p.A.	DPA
1	0	2008	Iveco S.p.A.	Fiat S.p.A.	DPA
1	0	2008	CNH Italia S.p.A.	Fiat S.p.A.	DPA
1	1	2008	Flowserve Pompes Sas	Flowserve Corporation	DPA
1	1	2008	Nexus Technologies, Inc.	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	2009	UTStarcom Inc.	NA	NPA
1	1	2009	AGCO Corp.	NA	DPA
1	0	2009	AGCO Limited	AGCO Corp.	DPA
1	0	2009	AGCO Denmark A/S	AGCO Corp.	DPA
1	0	2009	AGCO S.A.	AGCO Corp.	DPA
1	1	2009	Helmerich & Payne, Inc.	NA	NPA
1	1	2009	Control Components, Inc.	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	2009	Novo Nordisk A/S	NA	DPA
1	1	2009	Latin Node, Inc.	eLandia International Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	1	2009	Kellogg Brown & Root LLC	KBR Inc.	Guilty Pleas
1	1	2010	Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.	NA	DPA
1	0	2010	Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G.	Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.	Guilty Plea
1	0	2010	Alcatel Centroatamerica S.A.	Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.	Guilty Plea

Each. Enf. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	0	2010	Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A.	Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.	Guilty Plea
1	1	2010	RAE Systems Inc.	NA	NPA
1	1	2010	Panalpina World Transport	NA	DPA
1	0	2010	Panalpina, Inc.	Panalpina World Transport	Guilty Plea
1	1	2010	Noble Corporation	NA	NPA
1	0	2010	Noble Drilling (Nigeria) Ltd.	Noble Corp.	NPA
1	0	2010	Noble Drilling Services Inc.	Noble Corp.	NPA
1	0	2010	Noble International Limited	Noble Corp.	NPA
1	1	2010	Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Co. Ltd.	Royal Dutch Shell plc	DPA
1	1	2010	Pride International, Inc.	NA	DPA
1	0	2010	Pride Forasol S.A.S.	Pride International	Guilty Plea
1	1	2010	Tidewater Marine International, Inc.	Tidewater Inc.	DPA
1	0	2010	Tidewater Inc.	NA	DPA
1	1	2010	Transocean Inc.	Transocean Ltd.	DPA
1	0	2010	Transocean Ltd.	NA	DPA
1	1	2010	ABB Inc.	ABB Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	0	2010	ABB Ltd.	NA	DPA
1	1	2010	Alliance One Tobacco Osh, LLC	Alliance One International Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	0	2010	Alliance One International AG	Alliance One International Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	0	2010	Alliance One International Inc.	NA	NPA
1	1	2010	Universal Corporation	NA	NPA
1	0	2010	Universal Leaf Tabacos Ltda.	Universal Corporation	Guilty Plea
1	1	2010	Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V.	ENI S.p.A	DPA
1	0	2010	Saipem S.p.A.	ENI S.p.A	DPA

Each. Enf. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	0	2010	ENI S.p.A.	NA	DPA
1	1	2010	Technip S.A.	NA	DPA
1	1	2010	Daimler AG	NA	DPA
1	0	2010	DaimlerChrysler China Ltd.	Daimler AG	DPA
1	0	2010	DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO (DCAR) (Now Mercedes - Benz Russia SAO)	Daimler AG	Guilty Plea
1	0	2010	Daimler Export and Trade Finance GmbH (ETF)	Daimler AG	Guilty Plea
1	1	2010	Innospec Inc.	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	2010	BAE Systems plc	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	2011	Bridgestone Corporation	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	2011	Armor Holdings, Inc.	BAE Systems Inc.	NPA
1	1	2011	Tenaris S.A.	NA	NPA
1	1	2011	Johnson and Johnson (DePuy)	NA	DPA
1	1	2011	Comverse Technology, Inc.	NA	NPA
1	0	2011	Comverse, Inc.	Comverse Technology, Inc.	NPA
1	0	2011	Comverse, Ltd.	Comverse Technology, Inc.	NPA
1	1	2011	JGC Corporation	NA	DPA
1	1	2011	Tyson Foods, Inc.	NA	DPA
1	1	2011	Maxwell Technologies, Inc.	NA	DPA
1	1	2011	Aon Corporation	NA	NPA
1	1	2011	Magyar Telekom	Deutsche Telekom	DPA
1	0	2011	Deutsche Telekom AG	NA	NPA
1	1	2012	Tyco International, Ltd.	NA	NPA
1	0	2012	Tyco Valves and Controls Middle East, Inc.	Tyco Int'l Ltd.	Guilty Plea

Each. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	1	2012	Pfizer H.C.P. Corporation	Pfizer Inc.	DPA
1	1	2012	The NORDAM Group, Inc.	NA	NPA
1	1	2012	Orthofix International, N.V.	NA	DPA
1	1	2012	Data Systems & Solutions LLC	NA	DPA
1	1	2012	Biomet, Inc.	NA	DPA
1	1	2012	Bizjet International Sales and Support, Inc.	Lufthansa Technik AG	DPA
1	0	2012	Lufthansa Technik AG	NA	NPA
1	1	2012	Smith & Nephew, Inc.	Smith & Nephew plc	DPA
1	1	2012	Marubeni Corporation	NA	DPA
1	1	2013	Archer Daniels Midland Company	NA	NPA
1	0	2013	Alfred C. Toepfer International (Ukraine) Ltd.	Archer Daniels Midland Company	Guilty Plea
1	1	2013	Bilfinger SE	NA	DPA
1	1	2013	Weatherford International Ltd.	NA	DPA
1	0	2013	Weatherford Services, Ltd.	Weatherford International Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	1	2013	Diebold, Inc.	NA	DPA
1	1	2013	Total, S.A.	NA	DPA
1	1	2013	Ralph Lauren Corporation	NA	NPA
1	1	2013	Parker Drilling Company	NA	DPA
1	1	2014	Alstom S.A.	NA	DPA
1	0	2014	Alstom Network Schweiz AG (formerly Alstom Prom)	Alstom	Guilty Plea
1	0	2014	Alstom Power Inc.	Alstom	Guilty Plea
1	0	2014	Alstom Grid Inc.	Alstom	DPA
1	1	2014	Avon Products, Inc.	NA	DPA

Each. Enf. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	0	2014	Avon Products (China) Co. Ltd.	Avon Products, Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	1	2014	Dallas Airmotive	NA	DPA
1	1	2014	Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc.	NA	NPA
1	1	2014	ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O.	Hewlett-Packard Company (HP Co.)	Guilty Plea
1	0	2014	Hewlett-Packard Polska, SP. Z O.O.	Hewlett-Packard Company (HP Co.)	DPA
1	0	2014	Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.	Hewlett-Packard Company (HP Co.)	NPA
1	1	2014	Marubeni Corporation	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	2014	Alcoa World Alumina LLC	Alcoa Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	1	2015	Louis Berger International Inc.	NA	DPA
1	1	2015	IAP Worldwide Services, Inc.	NA	NPA
1	1	2016	Olympus Latin America Inc.	Olympus Corp. of the Americas (OCA)	DPA
1	0	2016	Olympus Corp. of the Americas	NA	DPA
1	1	2016	Vimpelcom Ltd.	NA	DPA
1	0	2016	Unitel LLC	VimpelCom Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	1	2016	Parametric Technology (Shanghai) Software Company Ltd.	PTC Inc.	NPA
1	0	2016	Parametric Technology (Hong Kong) Ltd.	PTC Inc.	NPA
1	1	2016	BK Medical ApS	Analogic Corporation	NPA
1	1	2016	LATAM AIRLINES GROUP S.A.	NA	DPA
1	1	2016	Och-Ziff Capital Management Group	NA	DPA
1	0	2016	Oz Africa Management GP	Och-Ziff Capital Management Group	Guilty Plea

Each. Enf. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	1	2016	Embraer S.A.	NA	DPA
1	1	2016	JP Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited	JPMorgan Chase & Co.	NPA
1	1	2016	Rolls-Royce PLC	NA	DPA
1	1	2016	Braskem S.A.	Odebrecht S.A.	Guilty Plea
1	0	2016	Odebrecht S.A.	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	2016	Teva LLC (Teva Russia)	Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	0	2016	Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.	NA	DPA
1	1	2016	General Cable Corporation	NA	NPA
159	94	Total			

APPENDIX B
DOJ FRAUD FCPA GUILTY PLEAS OBTAINED FROM CORPORATIONS FROM 2004 – 2016²¹⁸
Guilty Pleas Obtained – 46 total
Guilty Pleas Obtained Against Corporate Entities – 33 total

Each. Enf. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Guilty Plea	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	1	1	2004	ABB Vetco Gray, Inc.	ABB Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2004	ABB Vetco Gray (UK) Ltd. (later named Vetco Gray UK Ltd.)	ABB Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2005	DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd.	Diagnostic Products Corporation (DPC)	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2005	Titan Corporation	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2006	SSI International Far East, Ltd.	Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	0	0	2006	Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc.	NA	DPA
1	1	1	2007	Baker Hughes Services International, Inc.	Baker Hughes Incorporated	Guilty Plea
1	0	0	2007	Baker Hughes Incorporated	NA	DPA
1	1	1	2007	Vetco Gray Controls Inc.	Vetco International Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2007	Vetco International Limited	NA	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2007	Vetco Gray Controls Limited	Vetco International Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2007	Vetco Gray UK Limited	Vetco International Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	0	0	2007	Aibel Group Limited	Vetco International Ltd.	DPA
1	1	1	2008	Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (Siemens AG)	NA	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2008	Siemens S.A. (Argentina)	Siemens AG	Guilty Plea

218 The press releases for each guilty plea may be found on the DOJ Fraud website. See *id.*

Each. Inf. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Guilty Plea	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	0	1	2008	Siemens Bangladesh Limited	Siemens AG	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2008	Siemens S.A. (Venezuela)	Siemens AG	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2008	Nexus Technologies, Inc.	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2009	Control Components, Inc.	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2009	Latin Node, Inc.	elandia International Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2009	Kellogg Brown & Root LLC	KBR Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	1	0	2010	Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.	NA	DPA
1	0	1	2010	Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G.	Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2010	Alcatel Centroamerica S.A.	Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2010	Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A.	Alcatel-Lucent, S.A.	Guilty Plea
1	1	0	2010	Panalpina World Transport	NA	DPA
1	0	1	2010	Panalpina, Inc.	Panalpina World Transport	Guilty Plea
1	1	0	2010	Pride International, Inc.	NA	DPA
1	0	1	2010	Pride Forasol S.A.S.	Pride International	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2010	ABB Inc.	ABB Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	0	0	2010	ABB Ltd.	NA	DPA
1	1	1	2010	Alliance One Tobacco Osh, LLC	Alliance One International Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2010	Alliance One International AG	Alliance One International Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	0	0	2010	Alliance One International Inc.	NA	NPA
1	1	0	2010	Universal Corporation	NA	NPA
1	0	1	2010	Universal Leaf Tabacos Ltda.	Universal Corporation	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2010	Daimler AG	NA	DPA
1	0	0	2010	DaimlerChrysler China Ltd.	Daimler AG	DPA

Each. Enf. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Guilty Plea	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	0	1	2010	DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO (DCAR) (Now Mercedes -Benz Russia SAO)	Daimler AG	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2010	Daimler Export and Trade Finance GmbH (ETF)	Daimler AG	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2010	Innospec Inc.	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2010	BAE Systems plc	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2011	Bridgestone Corporation	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	0	2012	Tyco International, Ltd.	NA	NPA
1	0	1	2012	Tyco Valves and Controls Middle East, Inc.	Tyco Int'l Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	1	0	2013	Archer Daniels Midland Company	NA	NPA
1	0	1	2013	Alfred C. Toepfer International (Ukraine) Ltd.	Archer Daniels Midland Company	Guilty Plea
1	1	0	2013	Weatherford International Ltd.	NA	DPA
1	0	1	2013	Weatherford Services, Ltd.	Weatherford International	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2014	Alstom S.A.	NA	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2014	Alstom Network Schweiz AG (formerly Alstom Prom)	Alstom S.A.	Guilty Plea
1	0	0	2014	Alstom Power Inc.	Alstom S.A.	DPA
1	0	0	2014	Alstom Grid Inc.	Alstom S.A.	DPA
1	1	1	2014	Avon Products, Inc.	NA	DPA
1	0	1	2014	Avon Products (China) Co. Ltd.	Avon Products, Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2014	ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O.	Hewlett-Packard Company (HP Co.)	Guilty Plea
1	0	0	2014	Hewlett-Packard Polska, SP. Z O.O.	Hewlett-Packard Company (HP Co.)	DPA
1	0	0	2014	Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.	Hewlett-Packard Company (HP Co.)	NPA

Each. Enf. Action	Related Corp. Ent.	Guilty Plea	Year	Company	Parent (if applicable)	Enf. Action Type
1	1	1	2014	Marubeni Corporation	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2014	Alcoa World Alumina LLC	Alcoa Inc.	Guilty Plea
1	1	0	2016	Vimpelcom Ltd.	NA	DPA
1	0	1	2016	Unitel LLC	VimpelCom Ltd.	Guilty Plea
1	1	0	2016	Och-Ziff Capital Management Group	NA	DPA
1	0	1	2016	Oz Africa Management GP	Och-Ziff Capital Management Group	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2016	Braskem S.A.	Odebrecht S.A.	Guilty Plea
1	0	1	2016	Odebrecht S.A.	NA	Guilty Plea
1	1	1	2016	Teva LLC (Teva Russia)	Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.	Guilty Plea
67	33	46	Total			

APPENDIX C

FCPA Case Study:

Repeat Offenders Data Set

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
1	Parent: ABB Ltd. Other Related Entities: ABB Vetco Gray, Inc.; ABB Vetco Gray (UK) Ltd. (later named Vetco Gray UK Ltd.)	2: Similar behavior, dissimilar purpose	2001, Antitrust, DOJ	No	Yes - ABB Middle East & Africa Participations AG	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd. Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Bid Rigging on USAID Construction Contract in Egypt (Apr. 12, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2001/7984.pdf
			2004, FCPA, DOJ, SEC	No - credited for voluntary disclosure, violation unknown to government	Yes - ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. and ABB Vetco Gray UK Ltd.	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. and ABB Vetco Gray UK Ltd. Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges (Jul. 6, 2004), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/July/04_crm_465.htm https://perma.cc/AD38-VV8Z .
			2007, FCPA, DOJ	Yes - 2004 settlement noted in plea agreement; did not receive minimum fine in 2007	Yes - Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., Vetco Gray Controls, Ltd. and Vetco Gray UK Ltd. - by the time settlement reached no longer subsidiaries of ABB	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Three Vetco International Ltd. Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Agree to Pay \$26 Million in Criminal Fines (Feb. 6, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/February/07_crm_075.html https://perma.cc/4RU9-N39T .

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
			2010, FCPA, DOJ, SEC	Yes – “The organization or separately managed line of business committed a part of the instant offense less than five years after a criminal adjudication based on similar misconduct,” but only given minimum calculated fine.	Yes - ABB, Inc.	Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ABB Ltd and Two Subsidiaries Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Will Pay \$19 Million in Criminal Penalties (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/abb-ltd-and-two-subsidiaries-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-will-pay [https://perma.cc/SJ6X-NB39]. Plea Agreement at 11, United States v. ABB, Inc., No. H-10-664 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2010), ECF No. 12.
2	Parent: Diagnostic Products Corporation (DPC) Other Related Entities: DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd.	0: No Repeat Offenses				
3	Parent: Titan Corp. Other Related Entities: NA	0: No Repeat Offenses				

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
4	Parent: Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. Other Related Entities: SSI International Far East, Ltd.	0: No Repeat Offenses				
5	Parent: Baker Hughes Inc. Other Related Entities: Baker Hughes Services International, Inc.	3: Unrelated behavior and purpose	2007, FCPA, DOJ, SEC	SEC Press release describes the FCPA violation as a violation of a 2001 SEC cease and desist order prohibiting violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA.	Yes - Baker Hughes Services International (BHSI)	Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Baker Hughes with Foreign Bribery and with Violating 2001 Commission Cease-and-Desist Order (Apr. 26, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-77.htm [https://perma.cc/JF4V-GVC4]. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Baker Hughes Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Bribing Kazakh Official and Agrees to Pay \$11 Million Criminal Fine as Part of Largest Combined Sanction Ever Imposed in FCPA Case (Apr. 26, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_296.html [https://perma.cc/2T36-3Y3Z].
			2010, Antitrust, DOJ	No	No	Final Judgment, United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., No. 1:10-CV-00659 (D.D.C. July 26, 2010), ECF No. 9-2.
			2016, Antitrust (only a complaint filed), DOJ	TBD - only complaint	No	Complaint, United States v. Halliburton Co., No. 1:16-CV-00233 (D. Del. Apr. 6, 2016), ECF No. 1.

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
6	Parent: Vetco International Ltd. Other Related Entities: Vetco Gray Controls Inc.; Vetco Gray Controls Limited; Vetco Gray UK Limited; Aibel Group Limited	0: No Repeat Offenses				
7	Parent: Siemens AG Other Related Entities: Siemens S.A. (Argentina); Siemens Bangladesh Limited; Siemens S.A. (Venezuela)	0: No Repeat Offenses				
8	Parent: Nexus Technologies, Inc. Other Related Entities: NA	0: No Repeat Offenses				
9	Parent: Control Components, Inc. Other Related Entities: NA	0: No Repeat Offenses				
10	Parent: eLandia International Inc. Other Related Entities: Latin Node, Inc.	0: No Repeat Offenses				

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
11	Parent: KBR Inc. Other Related Entities: Kellogg Brown & Root LLC	3: Unrelated behavior and purpose (outcome of pending litigation could change classification)	2009, FCPA, DOJ, SEC	No	Yes - Kellogg Brown & Root LLC	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay \$402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/kellogg-brown-root-llc-pleads-guilty-foreign-bribery-charges-and-agrees-pay-402-million [https://perma.cc/VD2B-75EF].
			2010, False Claims Act, DOJ	No	Parent and thirty-three subcontractors	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Sues Kellogg, Brown & Root for Alleged False Claims Act Violations Over Improper Costs for Private Security in Iraq (Apr. 1, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-sues-kellogg-brown-root-alleged-false-claims-act-violations-over-improper-costs-private [https://perma.cc/AK33-K59C].
			2014, False Claims Act, Anti-Kickbacks Act, DOJ	No	No	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Government Sues Kellogg, Brown & Root Services Inc. and Two Foreign Companies for Kickbacks and False Claims Relating to Iraq Support Services Contract (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-government-sues-kellogg-brown-root-services-inc-and-two-foreign-companies [https://perma.cc/CX73-L29H].
			2015, Dodd Frank Whistleblower Provision/Anti-Kickback Act, SEC	No	No	<i>In re</i> KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, 2015 WL 1456619 (Apr. 1, 2015).
			2015, False Claims Litigation	N/A	TBD – remanded to Fourth Circuit	<i>See</i> Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Carter, 135 S. Ct. 1970 (2015).

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
12	Parent: Alcatel-Lucent, S.A. Other Related Entities: Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G.; Alcatel Centroatmerica S.A.; Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A.	3: Unrelated behavior and purpose	2007, FCPA, DOJ, SEC	No	Yes - Lucent Technologies Inc.	Lucent Technologies Inc. Agrees to Pay \$1 Million Fine to Resolve FCPA Allegations, DEP't OF JUSTICE (Dec. 21, 2007), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/December/07_crm_1028.html [https://perma.cc/GT3B-MCN7].
			2010, FCPA, DOJ, SEC	No	Yes - Alcatel-Lucent France S.A.; Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G., and Alcatel Centroatmerica S.A.	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries Agree to Pay \$92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alcatel-lucent-sa-and-three-subsidiaries-agree-pay-92-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt [https://perma.cc/RM7T-NSU8].
			2012, False Claims Act, DOJ	No - settlement agreement not available online	Yes - Lucent Technologies World Services Inc.	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent Subsidiary Agrees to Pay U.S. \$4.2 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alcatel-lucent-subsidiary-agrees-pay-us-42-million-settle-false-claims-act-allegations [https://perma.cc/DQ5K-8EDV].
13	Parent: Panalpina World Transport; Other Related Entities: Panalpina, Inc.	3: Unrelated behavior and purpose	2005, OFAC Civil Penalties Enforcement, Treasury Department	No	Panalpina Inc.	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, OFAC Civil Penalties Enforcement Information for May 6, 2005 (May 6, 2005), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/05062005.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3HD-NPGR].
			2010, FCPA, DOJ	No discussion of OFAC penalties	Panalpina Inc.	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More Than \$156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/oil-services-companies-and-freight-forwarding-company-agree-resolve-foreign-bribery [https://perma.cc/EM9K-G6TB].
			2010, False Claims & Anti-Kickback Act, DOJ	No	Yes - Panalpina Inc.	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Freight Forwarder Panalpina Pays U.S. \$375,000 to Settle False Claims and Kickbacks Allegations (July 30, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/freight-forwarder-panalpina-pays-us-375000-settle-false-claims-and-kickbacks-allegations [https://perma.cc/B9S8-9ECG].
			2011, Antitrust, DOJ	No	No	Plea Agreement, United States v. Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd., No. 1:10-CR-00270-RJL (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2011), ECF, No. 9.

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
14	Parent: Pride International, Inc. Other Related Entities: Pride Forasol S.A.S.	0: No Repeat Offenses				
15	Parent: ABB Ltd.; Other Related Entities: ABB Inc.	See #1 above				
16	Parent: Alliance One International Inc.; Other Related Entities: Alliance One Tobacco Osh, LLC; Alliance One International AG	0: No Repeat Offenses				
17	Parent: Universal Corporation Other Related Entities: Universal Leaf Tabacos Ltda.	0: No Repeat Offenses				

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
18	Parent: Daimler AG Other Related Entities: DaimlerChrysler China Ltd.; DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO (DCAR) (Now Mercedes-Benz Russia SAO); Daimler Export and Trade Finance GmbH (ETF)	0: No Repeat Offenses				
19	Parent: Innospec Inc. Other Related Entities: NA	0: No Repeat Offenses				
20	Parent: BAE Systems plc Other Related Entities: NA	3: Unrelated behavior and purpose	2010, FCPA, DOJ, SEC 2011, ITAR & AECA, State Dept	No No	No No	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay \$400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine [https://perma.cc/P4U9-YTLA]. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, BAE Systems plc Enters Civil Settlement of Alleged Violations of the AECA and ITAR and Agrees to Civil Penalty of \$79 Million (May 17, 2011), https://www.foley.com/files/BAES_StateDeptRelease18may11.pdf [https://perma.cc/G82X-W8UN]. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Armor Holdings Agrees to Pay \$10.2 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (July 13, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/armor-holdings-agrees-pay-102-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-violations-foreign-corrupt [https://perma.cc/MB6C-7RUW].

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
			2011, Discrimination, DOJ	Could not locate agreement	Yes - BAE Systems Ship Repair Inc., on behalf of BAE Systems Ship Repair Inc.'s subsidiary BAE Systems Southeast Shipyards Alabama LLC	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Virginia-Based BAE Systems Ship Repair Inc. (Dec. 28, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-virginia-based-bae-systems-ship-repair-inc [https://perma.cc/756D-RUWL].
			2014, False Claims, DOJ	Could not locate agreement	Yes - BAE Systems, Inc. and BAE Systems Tactical Vehicle Systems LP	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Defense Contractors Settle Alleged Violation of the False Claims Act for \$5.5 Million (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/defense-contractors-settle-alleged-violation-false-claims-act-55-million [https://perma.cc/3ZUQ-G2MW].
			2015, False Claims & Truth-in-Negotiations Act, DOJ	No	Yes - BAE Systems Tactical Vehicle Systems LP	Complaint, United States v. BAE Sys. Tactical Vehicle Sys., LP, No. 2:15-cv-12225 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2015), ECF No. 1.
21	Parent: Bridgestone Corporation Other Related Entities: NA	2. Similar behavior, dissimilar purpose	2011, FCPA & Antitrust, DOJ	No	Yes - Bridgestone Industrial Products of America, Inc. (parent company also involved)	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bridgestone Corporation Agrees to Plead Guilty to Participating in Conspiracies to Rig Bids and Bribe Foreign Government Officials (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bridgestone-corporation-agrees-plead-guilty-participating-conspiracies-rig-bids-and-bribe-0 [https://perma.cc/9ZS8-VUGV].

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
			2014, Antitrust, DOJ	Yes - called repeat offender, Press Release states repeated antitrust violations a factor in calculating 2014 fine	Yes - Bridgestone Industrial Products of America, Inc. (parent company also involved)	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bridgestone Corp. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Price Fixing on Automobile Parts Installed in U.S. Cars (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bridgestone-corp-agrees-plead-guilty-price-fixing-automobile-parts-installed-us-cars [https://perma.cc/E9A3-UH5B].
22	Parent: Tyco International, Ltd. Other Related Entities: Tyco Valves and Controls Middle East, Inc.	0: No Repeat Offenses				
23	Parent: Archer Daniels Midland Company Other Related Entities: Alfred C. Toepfer International (Ukraine) Ltd.	0: No Repeat Offenses				
24	Parent: Weatherford International Other Related Entities: Weatherford Services, Ltd.	0: No Repeat Offenses				

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
25	Parent: Alstom S.A. Other Related Entities: Alstom Network Schweiz AG (formerly Alstom Prom); Alstom Power Inc.; Alstom Grid Inc.	0: No Repeat Offenses				
26	Parent: Avon Products, Inc. Other Related Entities: Avon Products (China) Co. Ltd.	0: No Repeat Offenses				
			2007, Misleading Disclosures, SEC	No	No	<i>In re</i> Hewlett-Packard Co., Exchange Act Release No. 55801, 2007 WL 1515118 (May 23, 2007).
	Parent: Hewlett-Packard Company Other Related Entities: ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O.; Hewlett-Packard Polska, SP. Z O.O.; Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.	1: Similar behavior and similar purpose	2010, E-Rate Fraud, FCC, DOJ	No	No	Press Release, Fed. Comm'n. Comm'n. HP to Pay \$16.25 Million to Settle DOJ-FCC E-Rate Fraud Investigation (Nov. 10, 2010), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-302764A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F749-5Z9P].
27			2010, False Claims, DOJ	No - settlement agreement not available online	No	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Agrees to Pay the United States \$55 Million to Settle Allegations of Fraud (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-agrees-pay-united-states-55-million-settle-allegations-fraud [https://perma.cc/5PAP-7T9E].
			2014, False Claims, DOJ	No - settlement agreement not available online	No	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Company Agrees to Pay \$32.5 Million for Alleged Overbilling of the U.S. Postal Service (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-company-agrees-pay-325-million-alleged-overbilling-us-postal-service [https://perma.cc/A6L3-6RTM].

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
			2014, FCPA, DOJ, SEC	No	Yes - Hewlett-Packard Polska SP. Z O.O., ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O., Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V.	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packard-russia-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery [https://perma.cc/KJD7-FXFW].
28	Parent: Marubeni Corporation Other Related Entities: NA	1: Similar behavior and similar purpose	2012, FCPA, DOJ	No	No - Joint Venture with Kellogg, Brown & Root LLC	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Marubeni Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a \$54.6 Million Criminal Penalty (Jan. 17, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/marubeni-corporation-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay-546 [https://perma.cc/HM8J-ELWQ].

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
			2014, FCPA, DOJ	Yes - "The plea agreement cites Marubeni's refusal to cooperate with the department's investigation when given the opportunity to do so, its lack of an effective compliance and ethics program at the time of the offense, and its failure to timely remediate as several of the factors considered by the department in determining the resolution."	No	Press Release, FBI, Marubeni Corporation Sentenced for Foreign Bribery Violations (May 15, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/washingtondc/news/press-releases/marubeni-corporation-sentenced-for-foreign-bribery-violations [https://perma.cc/UP65-EEYD].
29	Parent: Alcoa Inc. Other Related Entities: Alcoa World Alumina LLC	0: No Repeat Offenses				

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
30	Parent: VimpelCom Ltd. Other Related Entities: United LLC	0: No Repeat Offenses				
31	Parent: Och-Ziff Capital Management Group Other Related Entities: Oz Africa Management GP	0: No Repeat Offenses				
32	Parent: Odebrecht S.A. Other Related Entities: Braskem S.A.	0: No Repeat Offenses				

#	Company	Repeat Offender Category	Year, Legal Violation, & Agency(ies)	Treated as Recidivist?	Violation Committed by Subsidiary?	Citation
33	Parent: Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Other Related Entities: Teva LLC (Teva Russia)	3: Unrelated behavior and purpose ³	2013, CAA, CWA, RCRA, DOJ, EPA	No	No	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA to Pay \$2.25 Million Civil Penalty for Air, Water and Hazardous Waste Violations at Missouri Facility (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-pay-225-million-civil-penalty-air-water-and-hazardous-waste [https://perma.cc/9H6C-PY4Y].
			2014, False Claims Act, DOJ, HHS	No	Yes (the parent and subsidiary (IVAX LLC) entered into the settlement)	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pharmaceutical Company to Pay \$27.6 Million to Settle Allegations Involving False Billings to Federal Health Care Programs (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/pharmaceutical-company-pay-276-million-settle-allegations-involving-false-billings-federal [https://perma.cc/76US-SSYX].
			2016, FCPA, DOJ		Yes (the parent and subsidiary (Teva LLC) entered into the settlement)	Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Agrees to Pay More than \$283 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practice Act Charges (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/teva-pharmaceutical-industries-ltd-agrees-pay-more-283-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt [https://perma.cc/NNM4-QDHB].

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219 At the conclusion of 2016, Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries (Teva) was under investigation for engaging in an antitrust violation that involved price collusion amongst generic drug makers. See Nathan Vardi, *The Man the Feds Are Using to First Crack Open Their Big Antitrust Case Against Generic Drug Makers*, FORBES (Dec. 14, 2016), <http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2016/12/14/the-man-the-feds-are-using-to-first-crack-open-their-big-antitrust-case-against-generic-drug-makers/#3d03fce16124> [<https://perma.cc/9FCG-QXHL>]. Also note, Teva acquired Cephalon Inc. in 2012, which had pending charges from the Federal Trade Commission for misconduct in 2008. Teva paid a \$1.2 billion fine for Cephalon's misconduct in 2015. I have not included this as a repeat offense, because the misconduct occurred well before Teva acquired the company and was known at the time of acquisition. Teva paid the fine shortly after the acquisition went through. *FTC Settlement of Cephalon Pay for Delay Case Ensures \$1.2 Billion in Ill-Gotten Gains Relinquished; Refunds Will Go to Purchasers Affected by Anticompetitive Tactics*, FED. TRADE COMM'N. (May 28, 2015), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-settlement-cephalon-pay-delay-case-ensures-12-billion-ill> [<https://perma.cc/5AHP-UMFA>].

